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Abstract. Hybrid games are models which combine discrete, continu-
ous, and adversarial dynamics. Game logic enables proving (classical)
existence of winning strategies. We introduce constructive differential
game logic (CdGL) for hybrid games, where proofs that a player can win
the game correspond to computable winning strategies. This is the log-
ical foundation for synthesis of correct control and monitoring code for
safety-critical cyber-physical systems. Our contributions include novel
static and dynamic semantics as well as soundness and consistency.
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1 Introduction
Logics for program verification can be broadly divided into two groups. Imper-
ative programs are typically verified with program logics such as Hoare calculi
[25] and dynamic logics (DL) [47] where modalities capture the effect of program
execution. Games logics (GL) [39], studied in this paper, are DL’s with a turn-
taking program connective to switch players. In contrast, functional programs
are often studied by writing the program in logic. In a dependent type theory
[13], a program’s type is its correctness specification. Classical higher-order logics
also specify functions and their correctness.
The Curry-Howard correspondence [16, 28] explains type-theoretic verifica-
tion: a constructive proof of a specification corresponds to a function which
provably implements that specification. Curry-Howard for program logics is far
less explored, but deserves exploration in order to answer: what is the computa-
tional content of a program-logic proof? This paper argues that the intersection
of Curry-Howard and program logic, both fundamental tools, provides an in-
sightful logical foundation. For example, we expect this correspondence will en-
able synthesis for programmatic models that are too challenging for automatic
synthesis without a proof.
Our hybrid games are as in differential game logic (dGL) [42], and combine
continuous dynamics, discrete computation, and adversarial dynamics to pro-
vide powerful models of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) such as transportation
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2 B. Bohrer and A. Platzer
systems, energy systems, and medical devices. But dGL is classical, so truth of
dGL formulas only implies classical existence of winning strategies for their hy-
brid games. Based on discrete Constructive Game Logic (CGL) [8], this paper
introduces Constructive Differential Game Logic (CdGL) for hybrid games with
a Curry-Howard interpretation that proofs that a player can win a hybrid game
correspond to programs implementing their winning strategies.
CdGL is a compelling use case for Curry-Howard-based synthesis among pro-
gram logics precisely because synthesizing a winning strategy of a hybrid game
is undecidable until a proof is provided; the combination of adversarial and con-
tinuous dynamics makes this so not just in theory but in practice. Curry-Howard
for games says proofs correspond to constructive winning strategies, allowing us
to reduce undecidable synthesis questions to verification questions which, while
still undecidable, are routinely verified with human assistance.
Contributions. We build directly on Constructive Game Logic (CGL) [8] for
discrete games and Differential Game Logic (dGL) [42] for classical hybrid games.
In combining these logics, we must constructively justify differential equation
(ODE) reasoning. This requires foundations in constructive analysis [6, 10], so
the proofs in Appendix B appeal to constructive formalizations of ODEs [15, 34].
We also contribute a new type-theoretic semantics, as opposed to the previous
realizability semantics [8]. This clarifies subtle side conditions and should be
useful in future constructive program logics. Our example model and proof,
while short, lay the groundwork for future case studies.
2 Related Work
We discuss related works on games, constructive logic, and hybrid systems.
Games in Logic. Propositional GL was introduced by Parikh [39]. GL’s are unique
in their clear delegation of strategy to the proof language rather than the
model language, allowing succinct game specifications with sophisticated win-
ning strategies. Succinct specifications are important: specifications are trusted
because proving the wrong theorem would not ensure correctness. Relatives with-
out this separation include SL [12], ATL [2], CATL [26], SDGL [22], structured
strategies [48], DEL [3, 5, 55], evidence logic [4], and Angelic Hoare Logic [35].
Constructive Modal Logics. We are interested in the semantics of games, thus we
review constructive modal semantics generally. This should not be confused with
game semantics [1], which give a semantics to programs in terms of games. The
main semantic approaches for constructive modal logics are intuitionistic Kripke
semantics [57] and realizability semantics [38, 32]. CGL [8] used a realizability
semantics which operate on a state, reminiscent of state in Kripke semantics,
whereas we interpret CdGL formulas into type theory.
Modal Curry-Howard is relatively little-studied, and each author has their
own emphasis. Explicit proof terms are considered for CGL [8] and a small frag-
ment thereof [30]. Others [58, 17, 11] focus on intuitionistic semantics for their
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logics, fragments of CGL. Our semantics should be of interest for these frag-
ments. We omit proof terms for space. CdGL proof terms would extend CGL proof
terms [8] with a constructive version of existing classical ODE proof terms [7].
Propositional modal logic [37] has been interpreted as a type system.
Hybrid Systems Synthesis. Hybrid games synthesis is a motivation of this work.
Synthesis of hybrid systems (1-player games) is an active area. The unique
strength of proof-based synthesis is expressiveness: they can synthesize every
provable system. CdGL proofs support first-order regular games with first-order
(e.g., semi-algebraic) initial and goal regions. While synthesis and proof are
both undecidable, interactive proof for undecidable logics is well-understood.
The ModelPlex [36] synthesizer for CdGL’s classical systems predecessor dL [44]
recently added [9] proof-based synthesis to improve expressiveness. CdGL aims
to provide a computational foundation for a more systematic proof-based syn-
thesizer in the more general context of games.
Fully-automatic synthesis, in contrast, restricts itself to some fragment in or-
der to sidestep undecidability. Studied classes include rectangular hybrid games [24],
switching systems [51], linear systems with polyhedral sets [31, 51], and discrete
abstractions [20, 19]. A well-known [54] systems synthesis approach translates
specifictions into finite-alternation games. Arbitrary first-order games are our
source rather than target language. Their approach is only known to terminate
for simpler classes [50, 49].
3 Constructive Hybrid Games
Hybrid games in CdGL are 2-player, zero-sum, and perfect-information, where
continuous subgames are ordinary differential equations (ODEs) whose duration
is chosen by a player. Hybrid games should not be confused with differential
games which compete continuously [29]. The player currently controlling choices
is always called Angel in this paper, while the player waiting to play is always
called Demon. For any game α and formula φ, the modal formula 〈α〉φ says Angel
can play α to ensure postcondition φ, while [α]φ says Demon can play α to ensure
postcondition φ. These generalize safety and liveness modalities from DL. GL’s
are distinguished from other DL’s by the dual game αd, which implements turn-
taking by switching the Angel and Demon roles in game α. The Curry-Howard
interpretation of proof of a modality 〈α〉φ or [α]φ is a program which performs
each player’s winning strategy. A game might have several winning strategies,
each represented by a different proof.
3.1 Syntax of CdGL
We introduce the language of CdGL. We introduce three classes of expressions
e: terms f, g, games α, β, and formulas φ, ψ.
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The valuation of a term is a real number understood constructively a la`
Bishop [6, 10]: effectivity requires that all functions on real numbers are com-
putable, yet effectivity does not require that variables range over only com-
putable reals. Bishop-style real analysis preserves many classical intuitions (e.g.,
uncountability) about R while ensuring effectivity.
The simplest terms are game variables x, y ∈ V where V is the set of vari-
able identifiers. The game variables, which are mutable, contain the state of the
game, which is globally scoped. For every base game variable x there is a primed
counterpart x′ whose purpose is to track the time derivative of x within an ODE.
Real-valued terms f, g are simply (Type-2 [56]) effective functions, usually from
states to reals. Type-2 effectivity means f must be computable when values are
represented as streams of bits. It is occasionally useful for f to return a tuple of
reals, which are computable when every component is computable.
Definition 1 (Terms). A term f, g is any computable function over the game
state. The following constructs appear in our example:
f, g ::= · · · | c | x | f + g | f · g | f/g | min(f, g) | max(f, g) | (f)′
where c ∈ R is a real literal, x a game variable, f + g a sum, f · g a product,
and f/g is the quotient in real division of f by g. Divisors g are assumed to
be nonzero. Minimum and maximum of terms f and g are written min(f, g)
and max(f, g). Any differentiable term f has a definable (Section ??) spatial
differential term (f)′, which agrees with the time derivative within an ODE.
Because CdGL is constructive, Angel strategies must make their choices com-
putably. Until his turn, Demon just observes Angel’s choices, and does not care
whether Angel made them computably. We informally discuss how a game is
played here, then give full winning conditions in Section 4.2. In red are the ODE
and dual games, which respectively distinguish hybrid games from discrete games
and games from systems.
Definition 2 (Games). The set of games α, β is defined recursively as such:
α, β ::= ?φ | x := f | x := ∗ | x′ = f &ψ | α ∪ β | α;β | α∗ | αd
The test game ?φ, is a no-op if Angel proves φ, else Demon wins by default
since Angel “broke the rules”. A deterministic assignment x := f updates game
variable x to the value of term f . Nondeterministic assignments x := ∗ ask An-
gel to compute the new value of x : R. The ODE game x′ = f &ψ evolves ODE
x′ = f for duration d ≥ 0 chosen by Angel such that Angel proves the do-
main constraint formula ψ is true throughout. We require that term f is locally
Lipschitz-continuous on domain ψ, so solutions are unique. ODEs are explicit-
form, so no primed variable y′ for y ∈ V is mentioned in f or ψ. Systems of
ODEs are supported, we present single equations for readability. In the choice
game α∪β, Angel chooses whether to play game α or game β. In the sequential
composition game α;β, game α is played first, then β from the resulting state.
In the repetition game α∗, Angel chooses after each repetition of α whether to
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continue playing, but must not repeat α infinitely. The exact number of repeti-
tions is not known in advance, because it may depend on Demon’s reactions. In
the dual game αd, Angel takes the Demon role and vice-versa while playing α.
Demon strategies “wait” until a dual game αd is encountered, then contain an
Angelic strategy for α. We parenthesize games with braces {α} when necessary.
Definition 3 (CdGL Formulas). The CdGL formulas φ (also ψ, ρ) are:
φ ::= 〈α〉φ | [α]φ | f ∼ g
Above, f ∼ g is a comparison formula for∼ ∈{≤, <,=, 6=, >,≥}. The defining
formulas of CdGL (and GL) are the modalities 〈α〉φ and [α]φ. These mean that
Angel or Demon respectively have a constructive strategy to play α and prove
postcondition φ. We do not develop modalities for existence of classical strategies
because those cannot be synthesized to executable code.
Standard connectives are defined from games and comparisons. Verum (tt)
is defined 1 > 0 and falsum (ff) is 0 > 1. Conjunction φ ∧ ψ is defined 〈?φ〉ψ,
disjunction φ∨ψ is defined 〈?φ∪?ψ〉tt, and implication φ→ ψ is defined [?φ]ψ.
Real quantifiers ∀xφ and ∃xφ are defined [x := ∗]φ and 〈x := ∗〉φ, respectively. As
usual, equivalence φ↔ ψ reduces to (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ), negation ¬φ is defined
φ → ff, and inequality is defined by f 6= g ≡ ¬(f = g). Semantics and proof
rules are needed only for core constructs, but we use derived constructs when
they improve readability. Keep these definitions in mind, because the semantics
and rules for some game connectives mirror first-order connectives.
For convenience, we also write derived operators where Demon is given con-
trol of a single choice before returning control to Angel. The Demonic choice
α∩β, defined {αd ∪ βd}d, says Demon chooses which branch to take, but Angel
controls the subgames. Demonic repetition α× is defined likewise by {{αd}∗}d.
We write φ yx (likewise for α and f) for the renaming of x for y and vice
versa in formula φ, and write φfx for the result of substitution of term f for game
variable x in φ, if the substitution is admissible (Def. 12).
3.2 Example Game
We give an example game and theorem statements, proven in Appendix A.
Automotive systems are a major class of CPS, so we consider simple time-
triggered 1-dimensional driving with adversarial timing. For maximum time T
between control cycles, we let Demon choose any duration in [T/2, T ]. This forces
Angel’s controller to be robust to realistic timing constraints, yet prohibits De-
mon from pathological “Zeno” behaviors.
We write x for the position of the car, v for the velocity, a for the current
acceleration, A > 0 for the maximum positive acceleration, and B > 0 for the
maximum braking rate. We assume x = v = 0 initially to simplify arithmetic. In
time-triggered control, the controller runs at least once every T > 0 time units.
Time and physics are continuous, T simply says how often the controller runs.
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Local clock t marks the current time within the current timestep, then resets at
each step. The control game (ctrl) says Angel can pick any acceleration a that
is physically achievable (−B ≤ a ≤ A). The clock t is then reinitialized to 0.
The plant game (plant) says Demon can evolve physics for duration t ∈ [T/2, T ]
such that v ≥ 0 throughout, then returns control to Angel. The lower bound on
t rules out Zeno strategies where Demon “cheats” by exponentially decreasing
durations to effectively stop time. The limit t ≥ T/2 is chosen for simplicity.
Typical theorems in DL’s and GL’s are safety and liveness: are unsafe states
always avoided and are goals eventually reached? Safety and liveness of the 1D
system has been proven previously: safe driving (safety) never goes past goal g,
while live driving eventually reaches g (liveness).
pre ≡ T > 0 ∧A > 0 ∧B > 0 ∧ v = 0 ∧ x = 0 post ≡ (g = x ∧ v = 0)
ctrl ≡ a := ∗; ?−B ≤ a ≤ A; t := 0
plant ≡ {t′ = 1, x′ = v, v′ = a& t ≤ T ∧ v ≥ 0}d
safety ≡ pre→ 〈(ctrl; plant)×〉x ≤ g liveness ≡ pre→ 〈(ctrl; plant)∗〉(x ≥ g)
Safety and liveness theorems, if designed carelessly, have trivial solutions. It is
safe to remain at x = 0 and is live to maintain a = A, but not vice-versa. In
contrast to DL’s, GL’s easily express the requirement that the same strategy is
both safe and live: we must remain safe while reaching the goal. This specification
is called reach-avoid, which we use because it is immune to trivial solutions. We
state and prove a new reach-avoid result for 1D driving.
Example 4 (Reach-avoid). The following is provable in dGL and CdGL:
reachAvoid ≡ pre→ 〈{ctrl; plant; ?x ≤ g; {?t > T/2}d}∗〉post
Angel reaches v = 0 ∧ g = x while safely avoiding states where x ≤ g does
not hold. Angel is safe at every iteration for every time t ∈ [0, T ], thus safe
throughout the game. The test t ∈ [T/2, T ] appears second, allowing Demon to
win if Angel violates safety during t < T/2.
0 g/2 g
x0
max
v
Fig. 1. Safe driving envelope
1D driving is well-studied for
classical systems, but the construc-
tive reach-avoid proof (Appendix A)
is subtle. The proof constructs a en-
velope of safe upper and live lower
bounds on velocity as a function of
position Fig. 1. The blue point indi-
cates where Angel must begin to brake to ensure time-triggered safety. It is
surprising that Angel can achieve postcondition g = x ∧ v = 0, given that tri-
chotomy (f < g∨f = g∨f > g) is constructively invalid. The key (Appendix A)
is comparison terms min(f, g) and max(f, g) are exact under Type 2 effectivity
where bits of min and max may be computed lazily. Our exact result encour-
ages us that constructivity is not overly burdensome in practice. When decidable
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comparisons (f < g+ δ ∨ f > g) are needed, the alternative is a weaker guaran-
tee x ∈ [g − ε, g] for parameter ε > 0. This relaxation is often enough to make
the theorem provable, and reflects the fact that real agents only expect to reach
their goal within finite precision.
4 Type-theoretic Semantics
In this section, we define the semantics of games and game formulas in type
theory. We start with assumptions on the underlying type theory.
4.1 Type Theory Assumptions
We assume a Calculus of Inductive and Coinductive Constructions (CIC)-like
type theory [13, 14, 53] with polymorphism and dependency. We assume first-
class anonymous constructors for (indexed [18]) inductive and coinductive types.
We write τ for type families and κ for kinds (those type families inhabited by
other type families). Inductive type families are written µt : κ. τ, which denotes
the smallest solution ty of kind κ to the fixed-point equation ty = τ
ty
t . Coin-
ductive type families are written ρt : κ. τ, which denotes the largest solution ty
of kind κ to the fixed-point equation ty = τ tyt . Per Knaster-Tarski [23, Thm.
1.12], the type-expression τ must be monotone in t to ensure that smallest and
largest solutions exist. We allow arbitrary proofs that τ is monotone; a major
reason we did not mechanize this work is that prominent proof assistants such
as Coq reject definitions where monotonicity requires nontrivial proof.
We use a single predicative universe which we write T and Coq writes Type
0. Predicativity is an important assumption because our semantic definition is a
large elimination, a feature known to interact dangerously with impredicativity.
We write Πx : τ1. τ2 for a dependent function type with argument named x of
type τ1 and where return type τ2 may mention x. We write Σx : τ1. τ2 for a de-
pendent pair type with left component named x of type τ1 and right component
of type τ2, possibly mentioning x. These specialize to the simple types τ1 → τ2
and τ1 * τ2 respectively when x is not mentioned in τ2. Lambdas (λx : τ.M)
inhabit function types. Pairs (M,N) inhabit dependent pair types. Application
is M N . Let-binding unpacks pairs and piLM and piRM are left and right pro-
jection. We write τ1 + τ2 for disjoint unions inhabited by ` ·M and r ·M, and
write case A of p⇒ B | q ⇒ C for case analysis.
We assume a real number type R and a Euclidean state type S. The pos-
itive real numbers are written R+, nonnegative reals R≥0. We assume scalar
and vector sums, products, inverses, and units. A state s : S assigns values to
every variable x ∈ V and supports operations s x and set s x v which respec-
tively retrieve the value of x or update it to v. The usual axioms of setters and
getters [21] are satisfied.
8 B. Bohrer and A. Platzer
4.2 Semantics of CdGL
Terms f, g are interpreted into type theory as functions of type S→ R. We will
need differential terms (f)′, a definable term construct when f is differentiable.
Not every term f need be differentiable, so we give a virtual definition, defining
when (f)′ is equal to some term g. If (f)′ does not exist, (f)′ = g is not provable.
We define the (total) differential as the dot product (·) of the gradient (variable
name: ∇) with s′, which is the vector of values s x′ assigned to primed variables.
To show that∇ is the gradient, we define the gradient as a limit, which we express
in (ε, δ) style. In this definition, f and g are scalar-valued, and the minus symbol
is used for both scalar and vector difference.
((f)′ s = g s) ≡ ∃∇ :R|s′| (g s = ∇·s′)*Πε : R+. Σδ : R+. Πr : S.
(‖r − s‖ < δ)→ |f r − f s−∇·(r − s)| ≤ ε‖r − s‖
For practical proofs, a library of standard rules for automatic, syntactic differ-
entiation of common arithmetic operations can be proven.
We model a formula φ as a predicate over states, i.e., a type family pφq :
S → T. A predicate of kind S → T is also understood as a region, e.g., pφq
is the region containing states where φ is provable. We say the formula φ is
valid if there exists a term M such that · ` M : (Πs : S. pφq s). That is, a
valid formula is provable in every state. The witness may inspect the state, but
must do so constructively. The formula semantics are defined in terms of the
Angelic and Demonic semantics of games, which determine how to win a game
α whose postcondition is φ. We write 〈〈α〉〉 : (S→ T)→ (S→ T) for the Angelic
semantics of α and [[α]] : (S→ T)→ (S→ T) for its Demonic semantics. Angel
and Demon strategies for a game α with postcondition P are inhabitants of
〈〈α〉〉 P and [[α]] P, respectively.
Definition 5 (Formula semantics).
p
[α]φ
q
s = [[α]] pφq s p〈α〉φq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s pf ∼ gq s = ((f s) ∼ (g s))
Modality 〈α〉φ is provable in s when 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s is inhabited so Angel has an
α strategy from s to reach region pφq on which φ is provable. Modality [α]φ is
provable in s when [[α]] pφq s is inhabited so Demon has an α strategy from s to
reach region pφq on which φ is provable. For ∼ ∈ {≤, <,=, >,≥, 6=}, the values
of f and g are compared at state s in f ∼ g. The game and formula semantics
are simultaneously inductive. In each case, the connectives which define 〈〈α〉〉
and [[α]] are duals, because [α]φ and 〈α〉φ are dual. Below, P refers to the
postcondition of the game and s to the initial state.
Definition 6 (Angel semantics).
We define 〈〈α〉〉 : (S→ T)→ (S→ T) inductively (by a large elimination) on α:
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〈〈?ψ〉〉 P s = pψq s *P s
〈〈x := f〉〉 P s = P (set s x (f s))
〈〈x := ∗〉〉 P s = Σv : τ. P (set s x v)
〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 P s = 〈〈α〉〉 P s + 〈〈β〉〉 P s
〈〈α;β〉〉 P s = 〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 P ) s
〈〈αd〉〉 P s = [[α]] P s
〈〈x′ = f &ψ〉〉 P s = Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
* (Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t)))
*P (set s (x, x′)
(sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
〈〈α∗〉〉 P s = (µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S. (P t→ τ ′ t) + (〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) s
Angel wins 〈?ψ〉P by proving both ψ and P at s. Angel wins the determin-
istic assignment x := f by performing the assignment, then proving P . Angel
wins nondeterministic assignment x := ∗ by constructively choosing a value v
to assign, then proving P . Angel wins α ∪ β by choosing between playing α or
β, then winning that game. Angel wins α;β if he wins α with the postcondi-
tion of winning β. Angel wins αd if he wins α in the Demon role. Angel wins
ODE game x′ = f &ψ by choosing some solution sol of some duration d which
satisifies the ODE and domain constraint throughout and the postcondition φ at
time d. While top-level postconditions rarely mention x′, intermediate invariant
steps do, thus x and x′ both appear updated in the postcondition. The construct
sol, s, d  x′ = f, saying sol solves x′ = f from state s for time d, is defined:
(sol, s, d  x′ = f) ≡ ((s x = sol 0) *Πr : [0, d]. ((sol)′ r = f (set s x (sol r))))
Angel strategies for α∗ are inductively defined: either choose to stop the loop and
prove P now, else play a round of α before repeating inductively. By Knaster-
Tarski [23, Thm. 1.12], this least fixed point exists because the interpretation of
a game is monotone in its postcondition (Lemma 7).
Lemma 7 (Monotonicity). Let P,Q : S → T. If Πs : S. (P s → Q s) is
inhabited, then so are (Πs : S. 〈〈α〉〉 P s→ 〈〈α〉〉 Q s) and (Πs : S. [[α]] P s→
[[α]] Q s)
Definition 8 (Demon semantics).
We define [[α]] : (S→ T)→ (S→ T) inductively (by a large elimination) on α:
[[?ψ]] P s = pψq s→ P s
[[x := f ]] P s = P (set s x (f s))
[[x := ∗]] P s = Πv : τ. P (set s x v)
[[α ∪ β]] P s = [[α]] P s * [[β]] P s
[[α;β]] P s = [[α]] ([[β]] P ) s
[[αd]] P s = 〈〈α〉〉 P s
[[x′ = f &ψ]] P s = Πd : R≥0. Πsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→(Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t)))
→P (set s (x, x′)
(sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
[[α∗]] P s = (ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S. (τ ′ t→ [[α]] τ ′ t) * (τ ′ t→ P t)) s
Demon wins [?ψ]P by proving P under assumption ψ, which Angel must
provide (Section 7). Demon’s deterministic assignment is identical to Angel’s.
Demon wins x := ∗ by proving ψ for every choice of x. Demon wins α∪β with a
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pair of winning strategies. Demon wins α;β by winning α with a postcondition
of winning β. Demon wins αd if he can win α after switching roles with Angel.
Demon wins x′ = f &ψ if for an arbitrary duration and arbitrary solution which
satisfy the domain constraint, he can prove the postcondition. Demon wins [α∗]P
if he can prove P no matter how many times Angel makes him play α. Demon
repetition strategies are coinductive using some invariant τ ′. When Angel decides
to stop the loop, Demon responds by proving P from τ ′. Whenever Angel chooses
to continue, Demon proves that τ ′ is preserved. Greatest fixed points exist by
Knaster-Tarski [23, Thm. 1.12] and Lemma 7.
It is worth comparing the Angelic and Demonic semantics of x := ∗. An Angel
strategy says how to compute x. A Demon strategy simply accepts x ∈ R as its
input, even uncomputable numbers. This is because Angel strategies supply a
computable real while Demon act with computable outputs given real inputs. In
general, each strategy is constructive but permits its opponent to play classically.
In the cyber-physical setting, the opponent is indeed rarely a computer.
5 Proof Calculus
To enable direct syntactic proof, we give a natural deduction system for CdGL.
We write Γ = ψ1, . . . , ψn for a context of formulas and Γ ` φ for the natural-
deduction sequent with conclusion φ and context Γ . We begin with rules shared
by CGL [8] and CdGL, then present the new rules for ODEs. We write Γ yx for the
renaming of game variable x to y and vice versa in context Γ . Likewise Γ fx is the
substitution of term f for game variable x. To avoid repetition, we write 〈[α]〉φ to
indicate that the same rule applies for 〈α〉φ and [α]φ. These rules write [〈α〉]φ for
the dual of 〈[α]〉φ. We write FV(e) and BV(α) for the free variables of expression e
and bound variables of game α respectively, i.e., variables which might influence
the meaning of an expression or be modified during game execution.
([∪]I) Γ ` [α]φ Γ ` [β]φ
Γ ` [α ∪ β]φ
(〈∪〉I1) Γ ` 〈α〉φ
Γ ` 〈α ∪ β〉φ
(〈?〉I) Γ ` φ Γ ` ψ
Γ ` 〈?φ〉ψ
([?]I)
Γ, φ ` ψ
Γ ` [?φ]ψ
([∪]E1) Γ ` [α ∪ β]φ
Γ ` [α]φ
(〈∪〉I2) Γ ` 〈β〉φ
Γ ` 〈α ∪ β〉φ
(〈?〉E1) Γ ` 〈?φ〉ψ
Γ ` φ
([?]E)
Γ ` [?φ]ψ Γ ` φ
Γ ` ψ
([∪]E2) Γ ` [α ∪ β]φ
Γ ` [β]φ
(hyp)
Γ, φ ` φ
(〈?〉E2) Γ ` 〈?φ〉ψ
Γ ` ψ
(〈∪〉E) Γ ` 〈α ∪ β〉φ Γ, 〈α〉φ ` ψ Γ, 〈β〉φ ` ψ
Γ ` ψ
Fig. 2. CdGL proof calculus: Propositional game rules
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Fig. 2 gives the propositional game rules. Rule [?]E is modus ponens and
[?]I is implication introduction because [?φ]ψ is implication. Angelic choices are
disjunctions introduced by 〈∪〉I1 and 〈∪〉I2 and case-analyzed by 〈∪〉E. Angelic
tests and Demonic choices are conjuctions introduced by 〈?〉I and [∪]I, eliminated
by 〈?〉E1, 〈?〉E2, [∪]E1, and [∪]E2. Rule hyp applies an assumption.
([:∗]I) Γ
y
x ` φ
Γ ` [x := ∗]φ
(〈:∗〉I) Γ ` 〈x := f〉φ
Γ ` 〈x := ∗〉φ
(〈[;]〉I) Γ ` 〈[α]〉〈[β]〉φ
Γ ` 〈[α;β]〉φ
(〈[:=]〉I) Γ
y
x , x = f
y
x ` φ
Γ ` 〈[x := f ]〉φ
([:∗]E) Γ ` [x := ∗]φ
Γ ` φfx
(〈:∗〉E) Γ ` 〈x := ∗〉φ Γ ` ∀x (φ→ ψ)
Γ ` ψ (x /∈ FV(ψ))
(M)
Γ ` 〈[α]〉φ Γ y
BV(α)
, φ ` ψ
Γ ` 〈[α]〉ψ
(〈[d]〉I) Γ ` [〈α〉]φ
Γ ` 〈[αd]〉φ
Fig. 3. CdGL proof calculus: First-order games (y fresh, f computable, φfx admissible)
Fig. 3 covers assignment, choice, sequencing, duals, and monotonicity. Repe-
tition games can be folded and unfolded ([∗]E,[∗]R). Angelic games have injectors
(〈∗〉S,〈∗〉G) and cases analysis (〈∗〉E). Duality 〈[d]〉I switches players by switching
modalities. Sequential games (〈[;]〉I) are decomposed as nested modalities.
Monotonicity M is Lemma 7 in rule form. The second premiss writes Γ yBV(α)
to indicate that the bound variables of α must be freshly renamed in Γ for
soundness. Rule M is used for generalization because all GL’s are subnormal,
lacking axiom K (modal modus ponens) and necessitation. Common uses include
concise right-to-left symbolic execution proofs and, in combination with 〈[;]〉I,
Hoare-style sequential composition reasoning.
Nondeterministic assignments quantify over real-valued game variables. As-
signments 〈[:=]〉I remember the initial value of x in fresh variable y (Γ yx ) for sake
of completeness, then provides an assumption that x has been assigned to f .
Skolemization [:∗]I bound-renames x to y in Γ , written Γ yx . Specialization [:∗]E
instantiates x to a term f . Existentials are introduced by giving a witness f
in 〈:∗〉I. Herbrandization 〈:∗〉E unpacks existentials, soundness requires x is not
free in ψ.
Fig. 4 provides rules for repetitions. In rule 〈∗〉I, M indicates an arbitrary
termination metric where  denotes an arbitrary (effectively) well-founded [27]
partial order with some zero element 0.M0 is a fresh variable which remembers
M. Angel plays α∗ by repeating an α strategy which always decreases the termi-
nation metric. Angel maintains a formula ϕ throughout, and stops once 0 <M.
The postcondition need only follow from termination condition 0 <M and con-
vergence formula ϕ. Simple real comparisons x ≥ y are not well-founded, but
inflated comparisons like x ≥ y+1 are. Well-founded metrics ensure convergence
in finitely (but often unboundedly) many iterations. In the simplest case,M is a
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(〈∗〉E) Γ ` 〈α
∗〉φ Γ, φ ` ψ Γ, 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ ` ψ
Γ ` ψ ([∗]E)
Γ ` [α∗]φ
Γ ` φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ
(〈∗〉S) Γ ` φ
Γ ` 〈α∗〉φ
([∗]R) Γ ` φ ∧ [α][α
∗]φ
Γ ` [α∗]φ
(〈∗〉G) Γ ` 〈α〉〈α
∗〉φ
Γ ` 〈α∗〉φ
(loop)
Γ ` J J ` [α]J J ` φ
Γ ` [α∗]φ
(FP)
Γ ` 〈α∗〉φ φ ` ψ 〈α〉ψ ` ψ
Γ ` ψ
(〈∗〉I)
Γ ` ϕ ϕ,0 <M ` φ
ϕ, (M  0 ∧M0 =M) ` 〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M)
Γ ` 〈α∗〉φ
Fig. 4. CdGL proof calculus: loops (M0 fresh)
real-valued term. GeneralizingM to tuples enables, e.g., lexicographic termina-
tion metrics. For example, the metric in the proof of Example 4 is the distance
to the goal, which must decrease by some minimum amount each iteration.
Rule FP says 〈α∗〉φ is a least pre-fixed-point. It works backwards: first show
ψ holds after α∗, then preserve ψ when each iteration is unwound. Rule loop is
the repetition invariant rule. Demonic repetition is eliminated by [∗]E.
Like any first-order program logic, CdGL proofs contain first-order reasoning
at the leaves. Decidability of constructive real arithmetic is an open problem [33],
so first-order facts are proven manually in practice. Our semantics embed CdGL
into type theory; we defer first-order arithmetic proving to the host theory.
Note that even effectively-well-founded < need not have decidable guards (M 4
0 ∨M < 0) since exact comparisons are not computable [6]. We may not be
able to distinguish M = 0 from very small positive values of M, leading to one
unnecessary loop iteration, after whichM is certainly 0 and the loop terminates.
Comparison up to ε > 0 is decidable [10] (f > g ∨ (f < g + ε)).
(DI)
Γ ` φ Γ ` ∀x (ψ → [x′ := f ](φ)′)
Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]φ
(DC)
Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]R Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ ∧R]φ
Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]φ
(DW)
Γ ` ∀x∀x′ (ψ → φ)
Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]φ
(DG)
Γ ` ∃y [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]φ
Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]φ
(DV)
ψ, h ≥ g ` φ Γ ` d > 0 ∧ ε > 0 ∧ h− g ≥ −dε
Γ ` 〈t := 0; {t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ}〉t ≥ d Γ ` [x′ = f ]((h)′ − (g)′) ≥ ε
Γ ` 〈x′ = f &ψ〉φ
(bsolve)
Γ ` ∀t :R≥0 ((∀r : [0, t] [t := r;x := sln]ψ)→ [x := sln;x′ := f ]φ)
Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]φ
(dsolve)
Γ ` ∃t :R≥0 ((∀r : [0, t] 〈t := r;x := sln〉ψ) ∧ 〈x := sln;x′ := f〉φ)
Γ ` 〈x′ = f &ψ〉φ
Fig. 5. CdGL proof calculus: ODEs. In bsolve and dsolve, sln solves x′ = f globally, t
and r fresh, x′ /∈ FV(φ)
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Fig. 5 gives the ODE rules, which are a constructive version of those from
dGL [42]. For nilpotent ODEs such as the plant of Example 4, reasoning via solu-
tions is possible. Since CdGL supports nonlinear ODEs which often do not have
closed-form solutions, we provide invariant-based rules, which are complete [46]
for invariants of polynomial ODEs. Differential induction DI [41] says φ is an in-
variant of an ODE if it holds initially and if its differential formula [41] (φ)′ holds
throughout, for example (f ≥ g)′ ≡ ((f)′ ≥ (g)′). Soundness of DI requires dif-
ferentiability, and (φ)′ is not provable when φ mentions nondifferentiable terms.
Differential cut DC proves R invariant, then adds it to the domain constraint.
Differential weakening DW says that if φ follows from the domain constraint,
it holds throughout the ODE. Differential ghosts DG permit us to augment an
ODE system with a fresh dimension y, which enables [46] proofs of otherwise
unprovable properties. We restrict the right-hand side of y to be linear in y and
(uniformly) continuous in x because soundness requires that ghosting y′ does
not change the duration of an ODE. A linear right-hand side is guaranteed to
be Lipschitz on the whole existence interval of equation x′ = f, thus ensuring
an unchanged duration by (constructive) Picard-Lindelo¨f [34]. Differential vari-
ants [41, 52] DV is an Angelic counterpart to DI. The schema parameters d and
ε must not mention x, x′, t, t′. To show that f eventually exceeds g, first choose
a duration d and a sufficiently high minimum rate ε at which h− g will change.
Prove that h−g is decreases at rate at least ε and that the ODE has a solution of
duration d satisfying constraint ψ. Thus at time d, both h ≥ g and its provable
consequents hold. Rules bsolve and dsolve assume as a side condition that sln is
the unique solution of x′ = f on domain ψ. They are convenient for ODEs with
simple solutions, while invariant reasoning supports complicated ODEs.
6 Theory: Soundness
Following constructive counterparts of the classical soundness proofs for dGL, we
prove that the CdGL proof calculus is sound: provable formulas are true in the
CIC semantics. We begin with standard lemmas. Full details in Appendix B.
Lemma 9 (Uniform renaming). If Γ ` φ then Γ yx ` φ yx .
Lemma 10 (Coincidence). Only free variables affect expressions’ meaning.
Lemma 11 (Bound effect). Game execution modifies only bound variables.
Definition 12 (Term substitution admissibility [40, Def. 6]). For a for-
mula φ, (likewise for context Γ, term f, and game α) we say φfx is admissible if
x never appears in φ under a binder of FV(f) ∪ {x}.
Lemma 13 (Term substitution). If Γ ` φ and the substitutions Γ fx , and φfx
are admissible, then Γ fx ` φfx.
Soundness of the proof calculus follows from the lemmas, and soundness of
the ODE rules employing several known results from constructive analysis.
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Theorem 14 (Soundness). If Γ ` φ is provable then Γ ` φ is valid. As a
special case, if (· ` φ) is provable, then φ is valid.
Proof Sketch. By induction on the derivation. The assignment case holds by
Lemma 13 and Lemma 9. Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 are applied when maintain-
ing truth of a formula across changing state. The equality and inequality cases
of DI and DV employ the constructive mean-value theorem (Theorem 21 in Ap-
pendix B), which has been formalized, e.g., in Coq [15]. Rules DW, bsolve, and
dsolve follow from the semantics of ODEs. Rule DC uses the fact that prefixes
of solutions are solutions. Rule DG uses constructive Picard-Lindelo¨f [34], which
constitutes an algorithm for arbitrarily approximating the solution of any Lips-
chitz ODE, with a convergence rate depending on its Lipschitz constant.
We have shown that every provable formula is true in the type-theoretic se-
mantics. Because the soundness proof is constructive, it amounts to an extraction
algorithm from CdGL into type theory: for each proof, there exists a program in
type theory which inhabits the corresponding type.
7 Theory: Extraction and Execution
Another perspective on constructivity is that provable properties must have
witnesses. We show Existential and Disjunction properties providing witnesses
for existentials and disjunctions. For modal formulas 〈α〉φ and [α]φ we show
proofs can be used as winning strategies: a big-step operational semantics play
allows playing strategies against each other to extract a proof that their goals
hold in some final state s. Our presentation is more concise than defining the
language, semantics, and properties of strategies, while providing key insights.
Lemma 15 (Existential Property). Let s ∈ S. If M : (pΣx : τ. φq s) then
there exist terms y : τ and N : (pφyx
q s).
Lemma 16 (Disjunction Property). If M : (pφ ∨ ψq s) then there exists an
N such that either N : (pφq s) or N : (pψq s).
Their proofs follow directly from their counterparts in type theory. The Dis-
junction Property considers truth at a specific state. It is not the case that
validity of φ ∨ ψ implies validity of either φ or ψ. For example, x < 1 ∨ x > 0 is
valid, but its disjuncts are not.
Function play below gives a big-step semantics: Angel and Demon strategies
as and ds for respective goals φ and ψ in game α suffice to construct a final
state s satisifying both. By parametricity, s was found by playing α, because
play cannot inspect p and q, thus can only prove them via as and ds.
play : Πα : Game. ΠP,Q : (S→ T). Πs : S. 〈〈α〉〉 P s→ [[α]]Q s→ Σt : S. p(P ∧Q)q t
Applications of play are written playα s as ds (P and Q implicit). Game consis-
tency (Corollary 17) is by play and consistency of type theory. Note that αd is
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played by swapping the Angel and Demon strategies in α.
playx:=f s as ds = (let t = set s x (f s) in (t, (as t, ds t)))
playx:=∗ s as ds = let t = set s x piLas in (t, (piRas, ds piLas))
playx′=f &ψ s as ds = let (d, sol, solves, c, p) = as s in
(set s x (sol d), (p, ds d sol solves c))
play?φ s as ds = (s, (piRas, ds (piLas)))
playα∪β s as ds = case (as s) of
as′ ⇒ playα s as′ (piLds)
| as′ ⇒ playβ s as′ (piRds)
playα;β s as ds = (let (t, (as
′, ds′)) = playα s as ds in playβ t as
′ ds′)
playα∗ s as ds = case (as s) of
as′ ⇒ (s, (as′, piLds))
| as′ ⇒ let (t, (as′′, ds′′)) = playα s as′ (piRds) in
playα∗ t as
′′ ds′′
playαd s as ds = playα s ds as
Corollary 17 (Consistency). It is never the case that both
p〈α〉φq s and
p
[α]¬φq s are inhabited.
Proof. Suppose as : p〈α〉φq s and ds : p[α]¬φq s, then piR(playα s as ds) : ⊥,
contradicting consistency of type theory.
The play semantics show how strategies can be executed. Consistency is a
theorem which ought to hold in any GL and thus helps validate our semantics.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We extended Constructive Game Logic CGL to CdGL for hybrid games. We con-
tributed a new static and dynamic semantics. We presented a natural deduction
proof calculus for CdGL and used it to prove reach-avoid correctness of 1D driving
with adversarial timing. We showed soundness and constructivity results.
The next step is to implement a proof checker, game interpreter, and syn-
thesis tool for CdGL. Function play is the high-level interpreter algorithm, while
synthesis would commit to one Angel strategy and allow black-box Demon imple-
mentations. In practice, Demon strategies represent some physical environment
which is not implemented in type theory. There is good justification to allow
black-box treatment of Demon: the Demon connectives are negative and thus
defined by their observable behaviors. Any program which behaves like a De-
mon is a Demon. Angel connectives are defined positively by their introduction
forms, thus the task of synthesis is to extract these contents into code form.
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A Example Proof
It is understood that reading these appendices is optional for the reviewers. We
include the appendices in the event that a reviewer wishes to read them. When
published, the appendices will be published in an online-only extended version.
We restate the definition of the 1D driving game and its reach-avoid specifi-
cation here:
ctrl ≡ a := ∗; ?−B ≤ a ≤ A; t := 0
plant ≡ {t′ = 1, x′ = v, v′ = a& t ≤ T ∧ v ≥ 0}d
pre ≡ T > 0 ∧A > 0 ∧B > 0 ∧ v = 0 ∧ x = 0
reachAvoid ≡ pre→ 〈(ctrl; plant; ?x ≤ g; {?t > T/2d})∗〉(g = x ∧ v = 0)
We first give an overview of our proof approach, then give the main algebraic
derivations, then finally the complete natural deduction proof.
A.1 Proof overview
While safety of 1D driving is a thoroughly studied introductory example, adver-
sarial 1D reach-avoid is more challenging due to the combination of adversarial
timing and liveness.
To simplify our arithmetic, the proof uses the same acceleration magnitude
C = min(A,B) to both accelerate and brake. The resulting strategy is conser-
vative, but still satisifies reach-avoid correctness. Our proof proceeds by conver-
gence: we establish a minimum distance ∆x which is traversed in each iteration,
guaranteeing that the goal is eventually reached. The minimum distance is de-
termined by appealing to a velocity envelope which is invariant throughout the
loop, given as a function of the position. Much of Section A.2 is devoted to iden-
tifying a velocity envelope which is invariant while also strong enough to ensure
liveness. The car’s velocity goes to 0 during braking, so the key is to show that
velocity decreases slowly enough to ensure progress. We depict the safe driving
envelope in Fig. 6.
A major task of the controller is to detect events within an adversarial en-
vironment. We detect one event: when are we close enough to the goal that we
must brake? Because our acceleration and braking rates are the same, it suffices
to begin braking by the midpoint x = g/2. Care is still required because the con-
troller is time-triggered : we must determine whether it is possible to cross the
midpoint within the coming timestep, and react right before we actually cross
the midpoint. In Fig. 6, the blue point BM(T ) is the point at which we would
start to react.
The other major task of the controller is to choose an acceleration value. Until
we approach the midpoint, the acceleration is at the maximum value C. Once
the midpoint is detected, acceleration is computed with a predictive method:
compute the state at the end of the timestep, and solve for the greatest C that
maintains safety.
20 B. Bohrer and A. Platzer
BM(T) AM(T)
LS RS
SLS SRS
0 xmid g
x0
UV(xmid)
v
Fig. 6. Safe driving envelope
Recall that CdGL features Type-2 effective computations on reals. We note
that in proofs which use inexact comparisons for constructive reals, only approx-
imate “reach” properties might be provable. The reason our proof obtains an ex-
act result is subtle: in Type-2 effectivity, the functions min(f, g) and max(f, g)
are exact comparisons, in contrast to inexact formula-level comparisons. Because
min(f, g) and max(f, g) are terms, Type-2 effectivity demands only that when
real numbers are represented as lazy streams of bits, the binary representation of
min(f, g) or max(f, g) could be computed lazily from the bits of f and g. Exact
min and max are implementable lazily: each bit of f is compared with the cor-
responding bit of g. In the case that f and g have identical bit representations,
this process will lazily return their bit representation. In the case that the bit
representations of f and g differ, the extremum will start by returning identi-
cal bits, then commit to a choice of f or g once a differing bit is found. While
there exist numbers with multiple binary representations (1.02 = 0.111 . . .2), this
simply means min and max are free to return either representation.
A.2 Algebraic derivations
We now algebraically derive the main equations of the proof, e.g., for invariant
regions, termination metrics, and acceleration control. In this section, “mono-
tonicity” does not refer to the monotonicity rule for game modalities, but to
monotone functions in the arithmetic sense, e.g.,
x ≥ y → f(x) ≥ f(y)
The following employs the well-known Newtonian motion equations:
v(t) = v(0) + at
x(t) = x(0) + v(0)t+
at2
2
Constructive Hybrid Games 21
Because our initial conditions are v(0) = x(0) = 0, we can often eliminate the
first terms. We write x(k) and v(k) for the values of x and v at the beginning
of a given iteration of the game loop, as opposed to the beginning of the game.
From the Newton equations we derive the safe-braking (SB) inequality, which
says braking rate −C suffices to stop the car by the time x reaches g:
SB ≡
(
v2
2C
≤ g − x
)
When the equality is strict, then x reaches g exactly as the car stops.
We write xmid for the midpoint, i.e., g/2. We write vmid for the maximum
velocity which may ever be attained, i.e., the maximum velocity one might have
at the midpoint and still brake safely. We write UV(x) for the upper bound of
permissible velocity at a position x. The shape of UV will be a convex “triangle”
which is 0 at x = 0 and x = g and attains value vmid at x = xmid. The shape
of UV is convex rather than a true triangle because its edges are defined by
square-root expressions defining the relationship between position and velocity.
Its left side (LS) is derived by setting the maximum acceleration a = C and
solving the Newton equations for v as a function of x:
LS(x) =
√
2Cx
The right side (RS) is derived by setting the braking acceleration to C, assuming
SB holds as a strict equality, and solving for v as a function of x:
RS(x) =
√
2C(g − x)
The upper velocity envelope is their minimum:
UV(x) = min(LS(x),RS(x))
We refer to the set of points bounded by these curves as the Large Triangle (LT),
with the understanding that its sides are actually convex curves.
Choosing a lower velocity bound LV(x) at each point x is more challenging,
because velocity necessarily decays as x approaches g. To prove that position
x = d is eventually reached, our proof must rule out so-called “Zeno” behaviors,
such as those where distanced traversed in each timestep decreases exponentially.
Ruling out Zeno behaviors requires a somewhat strong lower bound LV. Strong
bounds are of course desirable in and of themselves: the higher the bound, the
faster x is guaranteed to reach g.
Our control scheme predicts future motion: a control choice is safe if for
every duration t ∈ [0, T ], the motion is safe. By monotonicity, it suffices to show
the case t = T . The lower bound likewise predicts motion, we introduce several
helper functions which predict motion. We write BM(T ) (before midpoint) for
“the position x from which the car will reach the midpoint in time T at maximum
acceleration.” Under time-triggered control, BM(T ) is the “point of no return”
by which Angel must react, and we will safety detect the approaching midpoint
by comparing our position to BM(T ). We also write AM(T ) (after midpoint) for
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the conjugate point of BM(T ) opposite the midpoint. To derive BM(T ) we set
x(k)+UV(x(k))T+CT
2
2 = g/2 with the simplification that UV(x(k)) = LS(x(k))
before the midpoint. We solve (by computer):
x+
√
2CxT +
CT 2
2
= g/2
which yields
BM(T ) =
1
2
(−2T
√
Cg + CT 2 + g)
and its conjugate
AM(T ) =
1
2
(2T
√
Cg − CT 2 + g)
It is clear that control must be more conservative past BM(T ), the only
question is how conservative. For example, the minimum safe acceleration from
BM(T/2) is 0, which takes us to the boundary at AM(T/2) if Demon chooses
t = T . We might wonder if it is sufficient to exclude all states above the line
connecting BM(T/2) and AM(T/2), indicated by a red dashed line in Fig. 6. It
is not, under adversarial timing. Consider blue point BM(T/2) again. Demon
may choose t = T/2 so that by definition Angel regains control at x = xmid but
v < vmid. Demon now has a strategy to keep Angel strictly in the interior of
the Large Triangle indefinitely, so that the lower bound is eventually violated,
probably after AM(T/2).
Our envelope can only hope to be an invariant if a strict inequality LV(x) <
UV(x) holds for all x ∈ (xmid, g). We believe that the optimal lower bound is
particularly nontrivial, so we do not aim to show our bound is perfectly tight.
We do note that our bound is not exceptionally loose either. For example, if we
were to permit Demon to elapse physics up to time 2T, then any strategy more
aggressive than ours becomes clearly unsafe. Regardless, we believe the controller
used in this proof is tight modulo our simplifying assumption A = B = C, we
simply use this slightly looser bound for the sake of proving liveness.
The starting observation is that Angel might need to decrease acceleration as
early as BM(T ). The simplest live decision would be to construct a braking rate
aend > 0 which reaches g exactly when v = 0, and simply brake at rate a = −aend
until stopped. The braking curve of rate aend form the small right side (SRS) of
the triangle, while its mirror forms the small left side (SLS). Perhaps we could
reuse LS for the left side, but we preserve symmetry in hopes of simplifying the
proof.
Consider the upper-left point UL = (BM(T ),UV(BM(T ))) and upper-right
point UR = (AM(T ),UV(AM(T ))). The conservative braking rate aend is defined
by setting SB as an equality and solving for a as a function of x and v.
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(
UV(BM(T ))2
2aend
= g − BM(T )
)
iff
(
aend =
LS(BM(T ))2
2(g − BM(T ))
)
=
LS( 12 (−2T
√
Cg + CT 2 + g))2
2(g − 12 (−2T
√
Cg + CT 2 + g))
=
LS( 12 (−2T
√
Cg + CT 2 + g))2
2g + 2T
√
Cg − CT 2 − g
=
LS( 12 (−2T
√
Cg + CT 2 + g))2
g + 2T
√
Cg − CT 2
=
LS(−T√Cg + CT 2/2 + g/2))2
g + 2T
√
Cg − CT 2
=
(√
2C(−T√Cg + C/2T 2 + g/2)
)2
g + 2T
√
Cg − CT 2
=
2C(−T√Cg + CT 2/2 + g/2)
g + 2T
√
Cg − CT 2
=
C(
√
g − T√C)2
g + 2T
√
Cg − CT 2
Then we define the Small Triangle (ST) as the set of points bounded by:
SLS(x) =
√
2aendx
SRS(x) =
√
2aend(g − x)
The lower velocity envelope is their minimum:
LV(x) = min(SLS(x),SRS(x))
We are finally ready to give the variant formula J and the progress term ∆x
which induces the termination metric. The variant simply says the velocity is
between the envelopes and gives the signs of state variables:
J ↔ LV(x) ≤ v ≤ UV(x) ∧ x ≥ 0 ∧ v ≥ 0
The minimum progress is found by taking the shortest distance traversed
along any path of duration T/2 contained within the envelope between triangles
LTand ST:
∆x = inf
(x,v)∈LT\ST,t∈[T/2,T ]
inf
a
(vt/2 + at2/2)
where a ranges over accelerations which remain within the envelope for time t.
We observe that distance traversed is monotone in x, v, and t. Thus it suffices to
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consider the worst case where t = T/2, x = 0, v = 0, a = −aend. The worst-case
acceleration is a = aend because aend defines the lower bound of the velocity
envelope. The worst case is then
aendT
2
8
We construct our termination argument. We useM≡ (g−x) as our termination
metric with terminal value 0 = 0 and define a ≺ b↔ a+∆x ≤ b. As usual, the
convergence proof will need only prove a disjunction: either M has decreased
or it is equal to zero. It sometimes happens that the penultimate step actually
reaches x = g but can only prove that (g − x) has decreased, in which case the
final step will observe x = g and terminate. We are simply observing that such
behavior is permissible: when we observe the goal has already been reached, it
is irrelevantly how much progress the final (i.e., previous) step had made.
The invariant and metric are major components of the proof. The last major
component is the strategy for choosing a, which we have only alluded to thus
far. We wish to set the highest acceleration that is guaranteed to remain within
the velocity envelope.
To find this acceleration, recall the motion equations:
x(k + t) = x(k) + v(k)t+ a
t2
2
v(k + t) = v(k) + at
where v(k) and x(k) are the values of state variables v and x at the start of the
current iteration of the game loop.
The most aggressive safe acceleration is that which satisfies SB as a strict
equality after the pessimal time interval T , so we set
(v + aT )2
2C
=
(
g − (x(k) + v(k)t+ at
2
2
)
)
and solve for a. Wolfram Alpha gives two conjugate solutions (assuming T 6= 0
and C 6= 0, which are true):
a = −
√
C
√
CT 2 + 8g − 4Tv − 8x+ CT + 2v
2T
a =
√
C
√
CT 2 + 8g − 4Tv − 8x+ CT + 2v
2T
, the latter of which is positive.
We take this second solution as a candidate for the acceleration:
acand =
√
C
√
CT 2 + 8g − 4Tv − 8x− CT − 2v
2T
Recall that accelerations are required to fall within the range [−B,A] and that
for simplicitly we show the stronger condition a ∈ [−C,C]. The lower bound
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acand ≥ −C holds by construction: acand is the greatest acceleration which re-
mains within the safe envelope. By construction of the envelope, an acceleration
−C always remains below the upper limit, so acand must be at least −C. The
upper bound acand ≤ C does not hold in general: we computed acand as the accel-
eration required to reach the maximum velocity in this timestep, when reaching
maximum velocity usually takes multiple timesteps. Thus the final acceleration
(acc) is computed by bounding acand against the upper limit C:
acc ≡ min (C, acand)
A.3 Natural Deduction Proof
We give a formal proof in the natural deduction calculus. We first give derived
rules and lemmas used in the proof, and we split the deduction into small pieces
for the sake of formatting.
Derived Rules The vacuity axiom for constant propositions (indicated p()) is
not sound for games [42]:
p() 6→ [α]p()
The following rule is sound for games, however, and can be derived from Lemma 11
and Lemma 7:
(GV)
Γ ` p() Γ ` 〈α〉Q
Γ ` 〈α〉p()
The formula Q is arbitrary: as soon as Angel has any winning strategy, vacuity
becomes sound. Q = tt is usually chosen in practice.
As discussed in Section 5, we do not axiomatize first-order reasoning in this
paper, but assume it has been implemented in “the host logic” Thus we label
first-order steps “FO” but do give arithmetic proofs in full axiomatic detail. To
be precise, the following (non-effective!) rule is sound:
(FOC)
∗
Γ ` φ (exists M : (Πs : S.
pΓ → φq s) and Γ, φ F.O.)
Lemmas We use several arithmetic facts throughout the proof.
Lemma 18 (Safe Upper Bound). Braking is safe when the upper velocity
bound is satisified. Formula v ≤ UV(x) → (g − x) ≥ SB(x, v) is provable in
context C > 0.
Proof. By first-order arithmetic.
Lemma 19 (Acceleration in Bounds). Our control algorithm only proposed
accelerations which are feasible. Formula SB → −C ≤ acc ≤ C → −B ≤ acc ≤
A] is provable in context A > 0 ∧B > 0 ∧ C = min(A,B) ∧ (g − x) ≥ SB.
Proof. The lower bound holds by construction: as discussed in the last section,
acc ≥ −C when (g − x) ≥ SB. The upper bound holds trivially because acc is
computed by bounding acand to C.
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Main Proof The main proof begins by applying the convergence rule 〈∗〉I,
which is parameterized by a well-order (M,0, <M) and an invariant ϕ. The
convergence metric is the remaining distanceM = (g− x) and the zero element
is 0 = 0. The ordering <M defines 0 less than all other states and otherwise
defines (s ≤ t) ≡ ((g − x) s + ∆x ≤ (g − x) t). The invariant ϕ says variables’
signs are preserved and that velocity remains within its envelope:
ϕ↔ (LV(x) ≤ v ≤ UV(x) ∧ x ≥ 0 ∧ v ≥ 0)
Note we do not include the sign conditions on T,A,B,C in the invariant because
they are constants. By GV, for any game α and constant proposition (indicated
p()), we have p()→ 〈α〉p() whenever 〈α〉ψ holds for any postcondition ψ. Loop
convergence contains such a proof, thus vacuity can always applied to constants
of a convergence proof in the inductive step.
Dpre
pre →ϕ
Dbody
ϕ, (0 4M∧M0 =M) →(ϕ ∧M0 M)
Dpost
ϕ ∧ 0 <M →φ
〈∗〉I pre →〈α∗〉post
implyR pre→ 〈α∗〉post
We first dispatch the precondition and postcondition steps, which are purely
arithmetic.
∗
FOCT > 0 ∧A > 0 ∧B > 0 ∧ v = 0 ∧ x = 0 →(LV(x) ≤ v ≤ UV(x) ∧ x ≥ 0 ∧ v ≥ 0)
By construction, when x = v = 0 then LV(x) = UV(x) = 0 and the first two
conjuncts are trivially satisfied. The latter two conjuncts follow directly from
v = 0 and x = 0.
∗
FOC(LV(x) ≤ v ≤ UV(x) ∧ x ≥ 0 ∧ v ≥ 0) ∧ 0 ≥ (g − x) →(g = x ∧ v = 0)
Since v ≤ UV(x) then (SB) v22C ≤ (g − x). The LHS is always nonnegative, so
x ≤ g. Since 0 ≥ (g−x) then x ≥ g so g = x as desired. Moreover v22C ≤ (g−x) = 0
so v = 0 as desired.
We proceed to the proof of the loop body. We abbreviate Γ ≡ LV(x) ≤ v ≤
UV(x) ∧ x ≥ 0 ∧ v ≥ 0, 0 ≤ (g − x) ∧M0 = (g − x) and φ ≡ LV(x) ≤ v ≤
UV(x) ∧ x ≥ 0 ∧ v ≥ 0 ∧M0 ≥ ∆x+ (g − x).
The first 〈?〉I step applies the lemma SB → acc ∈ [−B,A]. The second 〈?〉I
step applies the lemma Darith1. In the dsolve step, we write X(t) and V (t) for
the solutions of x and v, where X(t) = x+ vt+ acc t
2
2 and V (t) = v+ acc t. The
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domain constraint assumption in the dsolve step has been simplified monotonely.
Darith2
Γ, a = acc, T/2 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0 →[(X(t), V (t))/(x, v)]φ
[?]I Γ, a = acc, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0 →[(X(t), V (t))/(x, v)][?t > T/2]φ
〈[d]〉I Γ, a = acc, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0 →[(X(t), V (t))/(x, v)]〈?t > T/2d〉φ
〈?〉I Γ, a = acc, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0 →[(X(t), V (t))/(x, v)]〈?safe〉〈?t > T/2d〉φ
〈[;]〉I Γ, a = acc, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0 →[(X(t), V (t))/(x, v)]〈?safe; ?t > T/2d〉φ
dsolve Γ, a = acc, t = 0 →[x′ = v, v′ = a& t ≤ T ∧ v ≥ 0]〈?safe; ?t > T/2d〉φ
〈[d]〉I Γ, a = acc, t = 0 →〈plant〉〈?safe; t ≥ T/2d〉φ
〈[;]〉I Γ, a = acc, t = 0 →〈plant; ?safe; t ≥ T/2d〉φ
〈[:=]〉I Γ, a = acc →〈t := 0〉〈plant; ?safe; t ≥ T/2d〉φ
〈[;]〉I Γ, a = acc →〈t := 0; plant; ?safe; t ≥ T/2d〉φ
〈?〉I Γ, a = acc →〈?−B ≤ a ≤ A〉〈t := 0; plant; ?safe; t ≥ T/2d〉φ
〈[;]〉I Γ, a = acc →〈?−B ≤ a ≤ A; t := 0; plant; ?safe; t ≥ T/2d〉φ
〈:∗〉I Γ →〈a := ∗〉〈?−B ≤ a ≤ A; t := 0〉〈plant; ?safe; t ≥ T/2d〉φ
〈[;]〉I Γ →〈ctrl〉〈plant; ?safe; t ≥ T/2d〉φ
〈[;]〉I Γ →〈α〉φ
The remainder of the proof is Darith1 and Darith2. To prove them, we first
prove a lemmaDarith3. Γ, a = acc, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0→LV (X(t)) ≤ V (t) ≤ UV(X(t)).
To prove Darith3 prove the upper bound V (T ) ≤ UV(X(T )), then the lower
bound LV(X(T )) ≤ V (T ). The upper bound holds by construction since acc is
specifically chosen to remain within LV(T ). To show the lower bound, consider
two regions which partition the safe envelope. Let Region 1 be bounded by SLS,
LS, and SRS, while Region 2 is bounded by SRS, RS, and LS. Note that in our
strategy, case analysis on Region 1 vs. Region 2 is implicit in the comparisons
min and max. We make this case analysis explicit in our proof for the sake of
clarity. It suffices in Region 1 to show acc ≥ amin and in Region 2 to show
acc ≥ −C.
First consider an initial state (X(0), V (0)) ∈ Region 1. The acceleration can
be determined by first determining the distance δX = X(T ) − X(0) traversed
in time T , not to be confused with the global minimum traversed distance ∆x.
The greatest elapsed distance is attained at upper-left point UL = LS ∧ SRS
where, by definition of BM(T ) we have δX = (xmid − BM(T )). At this point,
the acceleration acc = C is clearly live. The next extremum is the upper-right
point UR = SLS ∧ SRS. Because amin defines the curve SLS, any acceleration
acc ≥ amin is live from any point on SRS. Monotonicity shows that all other
points are live because δX decreases with distance from SRS. That is, acc ≤
C → δX ≤ (xmid − BM(T )) = (AM(T )− xmid), so that X(T ) ≤ AM(T ). Then
acc increases as δX decreases. Since amin is defined to yield V (T ) = UV(X(T ))
only at X(T ) = AM(T ), then by monotonicity also V (T ) ≤ UV(T ).
From the UL and UR points, correctness of the entire Region 1 follows by
additional monotonicity and continuity arguments. Any point between UL and
UR has acc ∈ [amin, C] because the restriction of acc to this line is monotone. As
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we move toward the lower-left corner (LL), then acc can only increase: decreasing
V (0) or X(0) frees us to be less conservative. Thus acc ≥ amin everywhere in
Region 1 as desired.
From every point in Region 2, consider the simplistic braking rate asimp
which, if followed indefinitely, achieves x = g exactly when v = 0. The trajectory
of asimp is clearly within Region 2 for any initial point in Region 2. The value
asimp is always in [−C,−amin] and so is not only physically achievable but is
also live. Thus concludes the proof of Darith3.
ForDarith1 we prove Γ, a = acc, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0→[(X(t), V (t))/(x, v)]safe,
i.e., we prove Γ, a = acc, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0→X(t) ≤ g, assuming Darith3. Since
V (T ) ≤ UV(X(T )) ≤ RS(X(T )) then (SB) V (T )22C ≤ (g −X(T )). Since the LHS
is trivially nonnegative, the RHS is nonnegative, i.e. X(T ) ≤ g as desired.
We now prove Darith2, i.e., we prove Γ, a = acc, T/2 ≤ t ≤ T, V (t) ≥ 0
` [(X(t), V (t))/(x, v)]φ where we abbreviate: ρ1 = LV(x) ≤ v ≤ UV(x), ρ2 =
x ≥ 0, ρ3 = v ≥ 0, ρ4 = (M0 = (g − x)), ρ5 = a = acc, ρ4 = t ∈ [T/2, T ], ρ7 =
V (t) ≥ 0 and φ1 = LV(X(t)) ≤ V (t) ≤ LV(X(t)), φ2 = X(t) ≥ 0, φ3 = V (t) ≥
0, φ4 = (M0 ≥ ∆x+g−X(0)∨g = X(t)) so that the context (Γ, a = acc, 0 ≤ t ≤
T, V (t) ≥ 0)↔ ∧i ρi and [(X(t), V (t))/(x, v)]φ = ∧i φi. We prove each conjunct
φi. Conjunct φ1 is already proven by Darith3. We prove φ3 next to prove φ2 as a
corollary. We prove φ4 last.
In each case except φ4, it suffices to consider the case t = T by monotonicity.
We prove ρ3 by hypothesis rule: assumption ρ7 is the desired result.
We prove ρ2. We can prove it by the ODE solution or even more obviously by
DI. From the domain constraint, v ≥ 0 is an invariant. Then ρ2 says X(0) ≥ 0
and since x′ = v ≥ 0 then by DI we have X(T ) ≥ 0.
We prove ρ4. To do so, we must test whether we are in the “final” iteration
of the loop. We perform an inexact (formula-level) comparison of g − x against
aminT
2
16 with tolerance
aminT
2
16 so that we have constructively g − x ≤ aminT
2
8 ∨
g− x ≥ aminT 216 . In the former case since t ≥ T/2 we derive from construction of
a and the initial velocity envelope that V (0)
2
2a = (g − x) so by definition of X(t)
have X(t) = g which satisfies the right disjunct.
In the second case, not only does the test yield g −X(0) ≥ aminT 216 , but the
test t ≥ T/2 implies a stronger condition:
X(t)−X(0) ≥ aminT
2
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which combined with safe braking entails g −X(0) ≥ aminT 28 . Then
M0 ≥ ∆x+ (g −X(T ))
iff g −X(0) ≥ ∆x+ (g −X(T ))
iff X(T ) ≥ ∆x+X(0)
We argue by monotonicity. The elapsed distance δX is minimized (i.e., δX = ∆x)
when velocity and acceleration are minimized, that is when a = amin and x = 0.
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In the worst case Demon chooses t = T/2, and Demon is responsible for satisfying
the domain constraint V (t) ≥ 0 and test t ≥ T/2 simultaneously. Then by the
Newton equations, (X(T )−X(0)) ≥ δX = amin T 28 , which exactly the definition
of ∆x as required.
This completes the last case of the arithmetic lemma, which in turn closes
the final goal of the reach-avoid proof.
B Theory Proofs
We prove the stated meta-theorems of CdGL such as monotonicity, soundness,
the Existential Property, and the Disjunction Property.
B.1 Preliminaries and Assumptions
We first state preliminaries from the literature and assumptions.
Constructive ODEs. A difference between our soundness proof and that of dGL
is that we draw on results of constructive analysis rather than classical analysis.
The major results on which we rely have been proven in the literature, but
we restate them here because the theorem statements are otherwise difficult to
locate. The main catch in applying these results is that they are proven for time-
derivatives, whereas our differentials are spatial. For this reason, we will prove
Lemma 26 equating time and space differentials within the context of an ODE,
which justifies applying these existing results.
Theorem 20 (Constructive Picard-Lindelo¨f [15]). Picard-Lindelo¨f has been
formalized in Coq. We restate it from CoRN3. The functions and theorems ref-
erenced in our proof summary are also from the CoRN repository. Let τ1 and
τ2 be metric spaces and let f0 : τ1 → τ2 be uniformly continuous on some
region X ⊆ τ1. Consider the initial-value problem where f(0, y) = f0(y) and
(f)′(x, y) = v(x, y) and where v is Lipschitz on X.
Then there constructively exists a function f : τ1 → τ2 that solves the initial
value problem, i.e.,
– f(0, y) = f0(y)
– (f)′(x, y) = v(x, y)
Summary. The proof relies on the existence for each v of the well-known Picard
operator picardv : (τ1 → τ2) → (τ1 → τ2) and the fact that this operator is
contractive. When contracted iteratively, the limit is the solution of the ODE
(f)′(x, y) = v(x, y). The proof relies on the Banach fixed point operator fp such
that fp g g0 is a fixed point of g, computed as the limit of the sequence gi+1 = g gi
starting from the given g0. Specifically, define g0(t)(y) = f(0, y).
3 The statement of Picard-Lindelo¨f is in file ode/Picard.v of the CoRN repository.
See [15] for the URL and commit numbers on which our statements are based.
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1. By the Banach fixed point theorem, then fp picardv g0 is a fixed point such
that picardv (fp picardv g0) = (fp picardv g0).
2. fp picardv g0 is a solution of the IVP.
3. fp picardv g0 is constructive: its exact value is arbitrarily approximated by
iterating the picard operator.
Theorem 21 (Constructive Differential Induction (DI) Lemmas). The
following statements are restated from CoRN4 and are corollaries of the con-
structive Mean Value Theorem.
Let a, b : R with a < b, let I = [a, b]. Let ε : R > 0. Let F, (F )′, G, (G)′ : I →
R.
– Lemma (Feq-criterium) supports equational DI. If (F )′ = (G)′ on I and
there exists x ∈ I such that F x = G x, then F = G on I.
– Lemma (Derivative-imp-resp-less) supports strict inequational DI. If 0 <
(F )′ on [a, b] then F a < F b.
– Lemma (Derivative-imp-resp-leEq) supports nonstrict inequational DI. If
0 ≤ (F )′ on I, then F a ≤ F b.
The cases for > and ≥, which are also proven by CoRN, are symmetric.
Theorem 22 (Constructive DV Lemma). If (G)′ ≥ d on [a, b] for some
constant d > 0, then G(b)−G(a) ≥ d(b− a).
Proof. CoRN features a lemma (Law-of-the-Mean-Abs-ineq) which is almost our
desired lemma for DV: If (F )′ ≤ c on [a, b] for some constant c, then F (b) −
F (a) ≤ c(b − a). Assume (0) (G)′ ≥ d on [a, b] and (1) d > 0. Because (the full
statement of) (Law-of-the-Mean-Abs-ineq) supports c < 0 and b < a as well, it
suffices to let F = −G and c = −d, then from (0) and (1) have (2) (F )′ ≤ c
on [a, b] so by (Law-of-the-Mean-Abs-ineq) have F (b) − F (a) ≤ c(b − a), thus
G(b)−G(a) ≥ d(b− a) by definition of F and c as desired.
Static Semantics. The proof calculus and soundness proofs rely on standard
notions of free variables FV(e), bound variables BV(α), and must-bound vari-
ables MBV(α). The design decision must be made whether to characterize these
functions implicitly (semantically) or define them explicitly (syntactically). For
example the semantic free variables of an expression are the smallest set of vari-
ables which determine its meaning, while the syntactic free variables are all those
which appear in free position. The semantic free variables are never more than
the syntactic free variables, but sometimes are a strict subset. For a game α,
the syntactic bound variables BV(α), are those which are assigned on at least
one execution path of α, while the syntactic must-bound variables MBV(α) are
those which are assigned on every execution path of α.
Because we leave the language of terms f, g open (any well-typed term from
the meta logic is permitted) we have no choice but to characterize free term
4 See files ftc/CalculusTheorems.v and ftc/Rolle.v of CoRN [15].
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variables implicitly or assume a correct syntactic computation exists. For formu-
las and games we do have a choice: the language of games is closed and easily
admits a syntactic definition. In this work we use a closed formula language, but
certainly one might wish to use an open formula language; it could be useful to
use arbitrary type families τ : S→ T as the postcondition of a game modality:
〈α〉τ . This is easy for a semantic treatment of variables but not a syntactic one:
any new connectives would need new syntactic variable computations. Yet, a
syntactic characterization of free variables is required to show that our proof
rules are effective.
The cases for systems are those from [43], while the duality cases αd are
homomorphic [45]. However, for comparison, we briefly discuss their semantic
counterparts (note the different font) FV(e),BV(α), and MBV(α) based directly
on the coincidence and bound effect properties. For an expression e (term f,
formula φ, or game α), the semantic free variables FV(e) are those which can
influence the meaning of e. In these definitions, V = s V is an abbreviation for∧
x∈V x = s x where s x is a constant equal to the value of x in state s. We write
S{ for the complement of set S.
FV(f) =
⋂
{V | for all s, t : S if s = t on V then f s = f t}
FV(φ) =
⋂
{V | for all s, t : S if s = t on V then pφq s = pφq t}
FV(α) =
(⋂
{V | for all P : (S→ T) and s, t : S if s = t on V then 〈〈α〉〉 P s = 〈〈α〉〉 P t}
)
∩
(⋂
{V | for all P : (S→ T) and s, t : S if s = t on V then [[α]] P s = [[α]] P t}
)
BV(α) =
( (⋃{V | for all P : (S→ T) and s : S if 〈〈α〉〉 P s then 〈〈α〉〉 (P ∧ (V = s V )) s)
∩
(⋃
{V | for all P : (S→ T) and s : S if [[α]] P s then [[α]] (P ∧ (V = s V )) s
) ){
The semantic bound variables of games are the complement of the set of pre-
served variables, which are provably equal to their initial values regardless of
the postcondition. A semantic treatment does not strictly need a definition of
must-bound variables, because they are primarily used to provide a less conser-
vative definition of syntactic free variables. Regardless, a semantic definition can
be given:
MBV(α) =
⋃
({V | for all s, t : S if s = t on FV(α) then 〈〈α〉〉 (λss, 〈〈α〉〉 (λtt, ss = tt on V ) t) s})
∩
⋃
({V | for all s, t : S if s = t on FV(α) then [[α]] (λss, [[α]] (λtt, ss = tt on V ) t) s})
We now recall the syntactic definitions of free, bound, and must-bound vari-
ables for the sake of contrast and the sake of being self-contained.
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FV(f ∼ g) = FV(f) ∼ FV(g)
FV(〈α〉φ) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α))
FV([α]φ) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α))
FV(?φ) = FV(φ)
FV(x := f) = FV(f)
FV(x := ∗) = ∅
FV(x′ = f &ψ) = {x} ∪ FV(f) ∪ FV(ψ)
FV(α;β) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(β) \MBV(α))
FV(α ∪ β) = FV(α) ∪ FV(β)
FV(α∗) = FV(α)
FV(αd) = FV(α)
BV(?φ) = ∅
BV(x := f) = {x}
BV(x := ∗) = {x}
BV(x′ = f &ψ) = {x, x′}
BV(α;β) = BV(α) ∪ BV(β)
BV(α ∪ β) = BV(α) ∪ BV(β)
BV(α∗) = BV(α)
BV(αd) = BV(α)
MBV(?φ) = ∅
MBV(x := f) = {x}
MBV(x := ∗) = {x}
MBV(x′ = f &ψ) = {x, x′}
MBV(α;β) = MBV(α) ∪MBV(β)
MBV(α ∪ β) = MBV(α) ∩MBV(β)
MBV(α∗) = ∅
MBV(αd) = MBV(α)
While we reuse existing definitions of FV(·),BV(·), and MBV(·), we necessar-
ily offer new proofs of the coincidence and bound effect properties: our semantics
are entirely different from those of prior work. As discussed in the next para-
graph, FV(f) is not defined here, rather we assume there exists FV(f) function
which satisfies the coincidence lemma.
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Term Language. Because our term language reuses terms of the host type theory,
we must assume basic lemmas about the term language in order to prove the
corresponding lemmas for formulas and games. The following lemmas should
hold in any reasonable type theory. Coincidence, renaming, and substitution for
state variables s are fundamental operations in any λ-calculus, and we simply
require that these properties must be generalizable to program variables x, which
are simply projections of s.
Lemma 23 (Term coincidence). If s = t on FV(f), then f s = f t.
Justification. Just as definitions of FV(φ) and FV(α) have been given in the
literature, we are simply assuming that the host theory supports a notion of
free variables FV(f) for functions over states. We do not define it ourselves
because its exact definition depends on what operations are supported on R
and S. Once FV(f) has been defined, coincidence is simply the fundamental
correctness theorem for the FV(·) function.
Lemma 24 (Term renaming). (f yx ) s = f(s
y
x )
Justification. We are assuming that variables can be renamed in terms. This is
only a modest generalization of the α-renaming rule for variables s.
Lemma 25 (Term substitution). (fgx ) s = f(set s x (g s))
Justification.. Substitution for program variables is a modest generalization of
substitution for state variables.
Notations and abbreviations. Some notations are useful for brevity in the proofs
which may not have been mentioned in the main paper.
It is sometimes useful to talk of ODE solutions as yielding an entire state
rather than the value for one variable. Thus we abbreviate
Sol(t) = set s (x, x′) (sol t, f (set s x (sol t)))
for a state-valued solution.
B.2 Proofs of Stated Results
For semantic proofs about the inhabitance of types, we do not explicitly write
out the proof terms which inhabit them, since the proof terms are obvious from
our proofs-by-type-rewriting.
Lemma 26 (Differential Lemma). Assume (A1) (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and
(A2) t ∈ [0, d] and (A3) FV(g) ⊆ {x}. Recall that we abbreviate Sol(t) =
set s (x, x′) (sol t, f (set s x (sol t))). Then (g)′ (Sol t) = ddr [g (Sol r)] (t)
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Sketch. First observe the left-hand-side is the directional derivative of g at x =
sol t in direction x′ = f (set s x (sol t)) by the semantics of (g)′. By assumptions
(sol, s, d  x′ = f) and t ∈ [0, d] then Sol(t) x′ = dxdt , i.e., the directional
derivative and time derivative agree. Assumption (A3) is essential: differential
variables y′ are not bound in Sol for y 6= x, so g must not depend on them.
In practice, however, (A3) is not a limitation. Rather, before applying a
rule which relies on this differential lemma, one would apply a step that locally
transforms any additional game variables y into constants, which ensures their
derivatives are 0 as intended, also fulfilling the requirement of this lemma.
Lemma 27 (Monotonicity). Let P,Q : S → T. Note that in this lemma,
P and Q need not be of form pφq. If P s → Q s is inhabited for all s then
〈〈α〉〉 P s→ 〈〈α〉〉 Q s and [[α]] P s→ [[α]] Q s are inhabited for all s.
Proof. In each case, assume (0) P s → Q s for all s : S. Then fix some such
s : S, for which (0) trivially also holds. Then assume (1) 〈〈α〉〉 P s or [[α]] P s
to show 〈〈α〉〉 Q s or [[α]] Q s accordingly. We annotate a step with subscript 0
when its justification is fact (0), likewise for other facts.
The Angel and Demon cases are proven by simultaneous induction, of which
we list the Angel cases first.
Case x := f, have 〈〈x := f〉〉 P s = P (set s x (f s))→0 Q (set s x (f s)) =
〈〈x := f〉〉 Q s
Case x := ∗, have 〈〈x := ∗〉〉 P s = Σv : R. (P (set s x v)). Let v such
that (P (set s x v)). Then by (0), Q (set s x v), and picking the same v,
Σv : R. (Q (set s x v)) = 〈〈x := ∗〉〉 Q s.
Case ?φ, have 〈〈?φ〉〉 P s = pφq s *P s→0 pφq s *Q s = 〈〈?φ〉〉 Q s
Case x′ = f &ψ, have
〈〈x′ = f &ψ〉〉 P s
= Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
*(Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t)))
*P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
Then unpack d and sol such that (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and (Πt : [0, d]. P (set s x (sol t)))
so that P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))) and by (1) have
Q (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
so
Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
*(Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t)))
*Q (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
= 〈〈x′ = f &ψ〉〉 Q s
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Case α;β, have 〈〈α;β〉〉 P s = 〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 P ) s (2). Note by IH on β that (3)
for all s, have (〈〈β〉〉 P s)→ (〈〈β〉〉 Q s). Then (2) and (3) suffice to apply the IH
on α, giving 〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 Q) s = 〈〈α;β〉〉 Q s
Case α∪β, have 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 P s = 〈〈α〉〉 P s +〈〈β〉〉 P s = 〈〈α〉〉 Q s +〈〈β〉〉 Q s =
〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 Q s
Case α∗, have
〈〈α∗〉〉 P s
=(µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S
(P t→ τ ′ t)
+(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) s
Then note for all t have P t→ Q t so that
(µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (P t→ τ ′ t)
+(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) s
→(µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (Q t→ τ ′ t)
+(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) s
=〈〈α∗〉〉 Q s
Case αd, have 〈〈αd〉〉 P s = [[α]] P s →IH [[α]] Q s = 〈〈αd〉〉 Q s where the
step marked IH employs the IH from the simultaneous IH on Demonic games,
which applies because α is structurally smaller than αd.
We give the Demon cases.
Case x := f, have [[x := f ]] P s = P (set s x (f s))→0 Q (set s x (f s)) =
[[x := f ]] Q s
Case x := ∗, have [[x := ∗]] P s = Πv : R. (P (set s x v)), so (2) (P (set s x v))
for all v : R. Apply (2) for arbitrary v so by (1), (2) (Q (set s x v)) for all v : R,
thus Πv : R. (Q (set s x v)) = [[x := ∗]] Q s.
Case ?ρ, have [[?ρ]] P s = (pρq s → P s) (2). Assume pρq s so by (2), P s
and by (1), Q s, thus (pρq s→ Q s) = [[?ρ]] Q s.
Case x′ = f & ρ, have
[[x′ = f & ρ]] P s
=Πd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pρq (set s x (sol t)))
→ P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
Then for arbitrary d and sol and assume (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and (Πt : [0, d]. P (set s x (sol t))),
so that P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))) and by (0) have
Q (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
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giving
Πd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pρq (set s x (sol t)))
→ Q (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
=[[x′ = f & ρ]] Q s
Case α;β, have [[α;β]] pP sq = [[α]] ([[β]] P ) s, call this fact (2). Note by
IH on β that (3) for all s, have ([[β]] P s)→ ([[β]] Q s). Then (2) and (3) suffice
to apply the IH on α, giving [[α]] ([[β]] Q) s = [[α;β]] Q s
Case α ∪ β, have [[α ∪ β]] P s = [[α]] P s *[[β]] P s =IH [[α]] Q s *[[β]] Q s =
[[α ∪ β]] Q s
Case α∗, have
[[α∗]] P s
=(ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t→ [[α]] τ ′ t)
*(τ ′ t→ P t)) s
then since for all t have P t→ Q t then have
(ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λs :′ S
(τ ′ t→ [[α]] τ ′ t)
*(τ ′ t→ P t)) s
→(ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S
(τ ′ t→ [[α]] τ ′ t)
*(τ ′ t→ Q t)) s
=[[α∗]] Q s
Case αd, have [[αd]] P s = 〈〈α〉〉 P s →IH 〈〈α〉〉 Q s = [[αd]] Q s where the
IH is from the simultaneous induction on Angelic games.
The static semantics results are stated informally in the main paper for the
sake of brevity. We give full formal statements here with proof. The coincidence
lemmas for formulas, Angelic games, and Demonic games are proven by simul-
taneous induction. We also include results for contexts which are simply finite
conjunctions of formulas, and write pΓ q to mean the product of pφq for φ ∈ Γ .
The same holds of the renaming and substitution lemmas.
Note that we state coincidence and bound effect for games differently from
prior work [45] simply to avoid introducing some extra notations used in prior
work.
Lemma 28 (Formula coincidence). If s = t on FV(Γ ) ∪ FV(φ) then given
M such that pΓ q s ` M :(pφq s) there exists N such that pΓ q t ` N :(pφq t).
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Coincidence for contexts also holds: If s = t on FV(Γ ) and pΓ q s is inhabited
then pΓ q t is inhabited. Coincidence for the construct (sol, s, d  x′ = f) also
holds: If s = t on FV(f) ∪ {x} then (sol, s, d  x′ = f) = (sol, t, d  x′ = f)
Proof. The formula and context cases are proven by simultaneous induction with
one another and with Lemma 29.
Case · holds trivially because the unit tuple witnesses p·q t for all t.
Case Γ, ψ : Then (A0) pΓ, ψq s = pΓ q s * pψq s. Note FV((Γ, ψ)) = FV(Γ )∪
FV(ψ) as required to apply the IH. Apply the IH on smaller context Γ to get
pΓ q s → pΓ q t and apply the formula IH to get (1) pψq s → pψq t. Then from
(1) the right conjunct of (A0) have pψq t, then with the left conjunct of (A0)
have pΓ q t * pψq t = p(Γ, ψ)q as desired.
We note a simplification for the formula cases: In each case the proof of the
conclusion begins by assuming (A2) pΓ q t is inhabited, which by the context
cases Lemma 28 and because V ⊇ FV(Γ ) gives an inhabitant of (A4) pΓ q s.
Then by modus ponens on (A1) gives (A3) pφq s in each case. In short, in every
case we are entitled to simply consider formulas as in (A3) rather than sequents
(A1).
Case 〈α〉φ, have p〈α〉φq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s =IH 〈〈α〉〉 pφq t = p〈α〉φq t where the
IH applies because FV(〈α〉φ) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α)).
Case [α]φ, have
p
[α]φ
q
s = [[α]] pφq s
=
IH [[α]] pφq t = p[α]φq t where the IH
applies because FV([α]φ) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α)).
Case f ∼ g : Because FV(f ∼ g) = FV(f) ∪ FV(g) then by Lemma 23 have
f s = f t and g s = g t from which we derive pf ∼ gq s = (f s ∼ g s) = (f t ∼
g t) = pf ∼ gq t.
Case (sol, s, d  x′ = f) : Note (0) (s x = sol 0) iff (t x = sol 0) since
s = t on {x}. Also, s = t on FV(f) \ {x} so by Lemma 23 have (1) ((y)′ r =
f (set s x (sol r))) iff ((sol)′ r = f (set t x (sol r))) for all r ∈ [0, d]. Next, by
Lemma 23 have (2) f (set s x (sol r)) = f (set t x (sol r)) since s = t on FV(f).
Then by (0), (1), and (2) have (sol, s, d  x′ = f) = ((s x = sol 0) * (Πr :
[0, d]. ((sol)′ r = f (set s x (sol r))))) = ((t x = sol 0) * (Πr : [0, d]. ((sol)′ r =
f (set t x (sol r))))) = (sol, t, d  x′ = f)
Lemma 29 (Game coincidence). If s = t on V ⊇ FV(Γ )∪FV(α)∪ (FV(φ)\
MBV(α)) then:
– given M such that pΓ q s ` M :(〈〈α〉〉 pφq s) there exists N such that pΓ q t
` N :(〈〈α〉〉 pφq t)
– given M such that pΓ q s ` M :([[α]] pφq s) there exists N such that pΓ q t
` N :([[α]] pφq t)
Proof. Proven by induction simultaneously with Lemma 28.
In each case assume (A0) s = t on V ⊇ FV(Γ )∪FV(α)∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α))
and (A1) pΓ q s ` M :(〈〈α〉〉 pφq s) or pΓ q s ` M :([[α]] pφq s) as appropriate.
We note a simplification: In each case the proof of the conclusion begins by
assuming (A2) pΓ q t is inhabited, which by the context case of Lemma 28 and
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because V ⊇ FV(Γ ) gives an inhabitant of (A4) pΓ q s. Then by modus ponens
on (A1) gives (A3) 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s or [[α]] pφq s in each case. In short, in every case
we are entitled to simply consider formulas as in (A3) rather than sequents as
in(A1).
We give the Angel cases.
Case x := f : Since FV(x := f) = FV(f) note by Lemma 23 that (0) f s =
f t. Note that MBV(x := f) = {x} so (1) s = t on V ⊇ FV(φ) \ {x}. Then
〈〈x := f〉〉 pφq s = pφq(set s x (f s)) =0 pφq(set s x (f t)) =1 pφq(set t x (f t)) =
〈〈x := f〉〉 pφq t
Case x := ∗: Note that MBV(x := ∗) = {x} so (0) s = t on V ⊇ FV(φ)\{x}.
Then 〈〈x := ∗〉〉 pφq s = (Σv : R. pφq (set s x v)) =0 (Σv : R. pφq (set t x v)) =
〈〈x := ∗〉〉 pφq t
Case ?ψ, have 〈〈?ψ〉〉 pφq s = pψq s * pφq s = pψq t * pφq t = 〈〈?ψ〉〉 pφq t
Case x′ = f & ρ: By the case for (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and
have (0) (sol, s, d  x′ = f) = (sol, t, d  x′ = f). Note s = t on FV(ρ) \
{x} since FV(ρ) ⊆ FV(x′ = f & ρ) and {x, x′} = MBV(x′ = f & ρ) and x′ /∈
FV(ρ) by syntactic constraints, thus the IH on ρ applies to give (1) (Πr :
[0, d]. pρq (set s x (sol r))) = (Πr : [0, d]. pρq (set t x (sol r))). Likewise s = t on
FV(φ)\{x, x′} so the IH on φ gives (2) pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))) =
pφq (set t (x, x′) (sol d, f (set t x (sol d)))).
Then applying (1), (2), and (3) we have
〈〈x′ = f & ρ〉〉 pφq s
=Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
*(Πr : [0, d]. pρq (set s x (sol r)))
*(pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))))
=Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, t, d  x′ = f)
*(Πr : [0, d]. pρq (set t x (sol r)))
*(pφq (set t (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))))
=〈〈x′ = f & ρ〉〉 pφq t
as desired.
Case α;β: Note that FV(α;β) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α;β)) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(β) \
MBV(α)) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α;β)) = FV(α) ∪ ((FV(β) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(β))) \
MBV(α)) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(〈β〉φ) \MBV(α)) as required in the IH application.
Then 〈〈α;β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 pφq) s = 〈〈α〉〉 p〈β〉φq s =IH 〈〈α〉〉 p〈β〉φq t =
〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 pφq) t = 〈〈α;β〉〉 pφq t
Case α∪β: 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s +〈〈β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq t +〈〈β〉〉 pφq t =
〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 pφq t
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Case α∗: Note that FV(α) ∪ FV(φ) are the free variables of the fixed point
(µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (φ t→ τ ′ t) *(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)). Note s = t on FV(α) ∪
FV(φ) since FV(α∗) = FV(α) and MBV(α∗) = ∅. This suffices to ensure
〈〈α∗〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α∗〉〉 pφq t. Formally the proof follows by induction on the proof
that s belongs to the fixed point.
Case αd, have 〈〈αd〉〉 pφq s = [[α]] pφq s = [[α]] pφq t = 〈〈αd〉〉 pφq t
We give the Demon cases.
Case x := f, since FV(x := f) = FV(f) note by Lemma 23 that (0) f s =
f t. Note that MBV(x := f) = {x} so (1) s = t on V ⊇ FV(φ) \ {x}. Then
[[x := f ]] pφq s = pφq(set s x (f s)) =0
pφq(set s x (f t)) =1
pφq(set t x (f t)) =
[[x := f ]] pφq t
Case x := ∗: Note that MBV(x := ∗) = {x} so (0) s = t on V ⊇ FV(φ)\{x}.
Then [[x := ∗]] pφq s = (Πv : R. pφq (set s x v)) =0 (Πv : R. pφq (set t x v)) =
[[x := ∗]] pφq t
Case ?φ, have [[?ψ]] pφq s = (pψq s→ pφq s) =IH (pψq t→ pφq t) = [[?ψ]] pφq t
Case x′ = f & ρ: By the case for (sol, s, d  x′ = f) have (0) (sol, s, d  x′ =
f) = (sol, t, d  x′ = f). Note s = t on FV(ρ)\{x} since FV(ρ) ⊆ FV(x′ = f & ρ)
and {x, x′} = MBV(x′ = f & ρ) and x′ /∈ FV(ρ) by syntactic constraints, thus
the IH on ρ applies to give (1) (Πr : [0, d]. pρq (set s x (sol r))) = (Πr :
[0, d]. pρq (set t x (sol r))). Likewise s = t on FV(φ) \ {x, x′} so the IH on φ
gives (2)
pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
=pφq (set t (x, x′) (sol d, f (set t x (sol d))))
Then applying (1), (2), and (3) we have
[[x′ = f & ρ]] pφq s
=Πd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πr : [0, d]. pρq (set s x (sol r)))
→ pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
=Πd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, t, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πsol : [0, d]. pρq (set t x (sol r)))
→ (pφq (set t (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))))
=pφq (set t (x, x′) (sol d, f (set t x (sol d))))
Case α;β Note that FV(α;β) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α;β)) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(β) \
MBV(α)) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α;β)) = FV(α) ∪ ((FV(β) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(β))) \
MBV(α)) = FV(α) ∪ (FV([β]φ) \MBV(α)) as required in the IH application.
Then [[α;β]] pφq s = [[α]] (〈〈β〉〉 pφq) s = [[α]] p[β]φq s =IH [[α]] p[β]φq t =
[[α]] (〈〈β〉〉 pφq) t = [[α;β]] pφq t
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Case α∪β, have [[α ∪ β]] pφq s = [[α]] pφq s *[[β]] pφq s = [[α]] pφq t *[[β]] pφq t =
[[α ∪ β]] pφq t
Case α∗: Note that FV(α) ∪ FV(φ) are the free variables of the fixed point
(ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t→ [[α]] τ ′ t) *(τ ′ t→ pφq t)). Note s = t on FV(α)∪
FV(φ) since FV(α∗) = FV(α) and MBV(α∗) = ∅. This suffices to ensure
[[α∗]] pφq s = [[α∗]] pφq t. Formally the proof follows by coinduction on the
proof that s belongs to the fixed point.
Case αd, have [[αd]] pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq t = [[αd]] pφq t
Lemma 30 (Bound effect). Let V be a finite set of program variables. Let
the defined CdGL formula V = s V be shorthand for
∧
x∈V (Πt : S. (t x = s x))
meaning that the values of every x ∈ V at the present state match those of state
s. Formally, every s V in this formula is a real-valued literal. Recall that S{
denotes the complement of set S.
If V ⊆ BV(α){ then
– there exists M such that pΓ q s ` M :〈〈α〉〉 pφq s iff there exists N such that
pΓ q s `M :〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ V = s V q s.
– there exists M such that pΓ q s ` M :[[α]] pφq s iff there exists N such that
pΓ q s `M :[[α]] pφ ∧ V = s V q s.
Proof. By the same argument as in the coincidence lemma, sequent-style bound
effect follows trivially from formula-style bound effect. We first give a uniform ar-
gument for the converse direction, then prove the forward direction. The forward
direction performs an outer induction on the size of V, then an inner simultane-
ous induction on Angelic and Demonic games.
Converse direction: By left projection, pφ ∧ V = s V q s implies pφq s for all
s. Then by Lemma 27 have that 〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ V = s V q s implies 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s and
likewise for [[α]].
Forward direction: By induction on |V |, generalizing φ. The case |V | = 0
is trivial since 〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ (V = s V )q = 〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ ttq = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq. In the case
|V ∪ {x}| = k + 1 then apply the IH to pφ ∧ x = s xq and set V to get that
〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ x = s xq s iff 〈〈α〉〉 p(φ ∧ x = s x) ∧ (V = s V )q s. Since we also have
that (
p
(φ ∧ x = s x) ∧ (V = s V )q s = (pφ ∧ ((V ∪ {x}) = s (V ∪ {x}))q s), then
by transitivity it suffices to show that 〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ x = s xq s follows 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s. We
proceed by inner induction on games, simultaneously for Angel and Demon. In
each case we assume (A) 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s and show 〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s or likewise
for [[α]]. We do so by inner induction on games, simultaneously for Angel and
Demon.
We give the cases for Angel.
Case y := f : Since x /∈ BV(y := f) then (0) x 6= y. 〈〈y := f〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s =
(pφq (set s x (f s)) * (set s y (f s)) x = s x) =0 (
pφq (set s x (f s)) * s x = s x)
where the left holds by (A) and the right holds reflexively.
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Case x := ∗: From (A) have some v such that (A1) pφq (set s y v). Since
x /∈ BV(y := ∗) then (0) x 6= y.
〈〈y := ∗〉〉 (pφ ∧ x = s xq) s
=(Σv : R. pφq (set s y v) *((set s y v) x = s x))
=(Σv : R. pφq (set s y v) *(s x = s x))
where the left holds from (A1) and the right holds for any v since (s x = s x)
reflexively.
Case ?ψ, have 〈〈?ψ〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s = pψq s * pφq s *(s x = s x) =A
(s x = s x) which holds reflexively.
Case y′ = f &ψ: Note (0) x /∈ {y, y′} = BV(y′ = f &ψ). From (A) unpack d
and sol such that (1)(sol, s, d  y′ = f) and (2) (Πt : [0, d]. pφq (set s y (sol t)))
and (3) pψq (set s y (sol d)). Then by (0) have (4) (set s y (sol d)) x = s x. Then
using the same d and sol then using (1) (2) (3) and (4) have 〈〈x′ = f &ψ〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s
as desired.
Case α;β: Note (0) 〈〈β〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = t x)q t for all t by IH on β. Note (1) that
the truth value of (λr. t x = s x) is constant with respect to r so it suffices to
show 〈〈β〉〉pφq, which follows from (A).
〈〈α;β〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s
=〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q) s
=〈〈α〉〉 (px = s xq *(〈〈β〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q)) s
=〈〈α〉〉 (λt. t x = s x *(〈〈β〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x) tq)) s
←0〈〈α〉〉 (λt. t x = s x *(〈〈β〉〉 pφ ∧ (t x = s x)q t)) s
←〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉pφ ∧ (x = s x)q) s
←〈〈α;β〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s
which follows from the IH on α.
Case α∪β: Have either 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s or 〈〈β〉〉 pφq s. In each case, the IH applies
by BV(α ∪ β){ = BV(α){ ∪ BV(β){. In the first case, 〈〈α〉〉pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s →
〈〈α ∪ β〉〉pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s. In the second case,
〈〈β〉〉pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s→ 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s
Case α∗: Proceed by induction on membership of s in the fixed point in
〈〈α∗〉〉 pφq s.
In the base case, 〈〈α∗〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s trivially since s x = s x. In the
inductive case wish to show
p
φ ∧ (x = s x)q t → 〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)qt which
follows from the inner IH on membership and outer IH on α by transitivity and
monotonicity over α. The IH on α applies because BV(α∗) = BV(α).
Case αd: From (A) have [[α]] pφq s so by IH have [[α]] pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s
which gives 〈〈φd〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s.
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We give the cases for Demon.
Case x := f : Since x /∈ BV(y := f) then (0) x 6= y. Then [[y := f ]] pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s =
pφq (set s y (f s)) *((set s y (f s)) x = s x) =A ((set s y (f s)) x = s x) =0
(s x = s x) which holds reflexively.
Case x := ∗: Since x /∈ BV(y := ∗) then (0) x 6= y. Then [[y := ∗]] pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s =
(Πv : R. (pφq (set s y v) * (set s y v) x = s x)) =A (Πv : R. ((set s y v) x =
s x)) = (Πv : R. (s x = s x)) which holds for all v since (s x = s x) reflexively.
Case ?ψ, have [[?ψ]]
p
φ ∧ (x = s x)q s = (pψq s→ pφq s *(s x = s x) s) =A
(pψq s→ (s x = s x)) = (pψq s→ tt) since (s x = s x) holds reflexively.
Case x′ = f &ψ: Note (0) x /∈ {y, y′} = BV(y′ = f &ψ). Assume arbitrary d
and sol such that (1)(sol, s, d  y′ = f) and (2) (Πt : [0, d]. pφq (set s y (sol t)))
and (3) pψq (set s y (sol d)). Then by (0) have (4) (set s y (sol d)) x = s x.
Then using (1) (2) (3) and (3) have 〈〈x′ = f &ψ〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s as desired.
Case α;β: Note (0) [[β]]
p
φ ∧ (x = t x)q t for all t by IH on β. Note (1) that
the truth value of (λr. t x = s x) is constant as a function of r and it suffices to
show [[β]] (pφq) r.
[[α;β]]
p
φ ∧ (x = s x)q s
=[[α]] ([[β]]
p
φ ∧ (x = s x)q) s
=[[α]] (λt. px = s xq t *([[β]] pφ ∧ (x = s x)q t)) s
=[[α]] (λt. t x = s x *([[β]]
p
φ ∧ (x = s x)q t)) s
←0[[α]] (λt. t x = s x *([[β]] pφ ∧ (t x = s x)q t)) s
←1[[α]] (λt. t x = s x *([[β]] (pφq) t)) s
←1[[α]] ([[β]] pφq) s
←1[[α;β]] pφq s
which is (A).
Case α ∪ β: Have both [[α]] pφq s and [[β]] pφq s. Each IH applies by
BV(α ∪ β){ = BV(α){ ∪ BV(β){. The first IH gives [[α]] pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s and
the second gives [[β]]
p
φ ∧ (x = s x)q s, then by conjunction introduction have
[[α ∪ β]] pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s.
Case α∗: By inversion on the proof (A) of [[α∗]] pφq s, we have some J such
that (1) J s, (2) J t→ [[α]]J t for all t, and (3) J t→ pφq t for all t. We show
that J s ∧ x = s x is sufficient for an invariant proof of postcondition x = s x.
(1a) pJ ∧ x = s xq s from (1) and reflexivity. (2a) pJ ∧ x = s x→ [α](J ∧ x = s x)q t
because (2) gives a proof of [[α]] pJq t from which the IH on α gives [[α]] pJ ∧ x = s xq t
as desired. (3a)
p
(J ∧ x = s x)→ (φ ∧ x = s x)q t from (3) and hypothesis rule.
Then the coinductive generated by (1a), (2a), and (3a) is a proof of [[α∗]] pφ ∧ x = s xq s
as desired.
Case αd: From (A) have 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s so by IH have 〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ (x = s x)q s
which gives [[φd]]
p
φ ∧ (x = s x)q s.
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Lemma 31 (Transposition). e yx
y
x = e, for any CdGL or CIC term, formula,
game, or type e.
Proof. Trivial induction because we define e yx to be transposition renaming
which renames x to y but also renames y to x.
Lemma 32 (Formula uniform renaming). If Γ `M :(pφq s) then Γ yx `M yx
:φ yx . If M :
pΓ q s then M fx :
p
Γ yx
q
(φ yx ). Also, (sol, s, d  z′ = f) = (sol, s
y
x , d 
z yx
′
= f yx )
Lemma 33 (Game uniform renaming). If Γ ` M :(〈〈α〉〉 pφq s) then Γ yx `
M yx :(〈〈α yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx ). If Γ `M :([[α]] pφq s) then Γ yx `M yx :([[α yx ]] pφ yxq s yx ).
Proof of Lemma 32 and Lemma 33. The cases for formulas, contexts, solutions,
and games are all proven by simultaneous induction. We give the cases for con-
texts first.
Case ·, have · yx = · and p·q s holds trivially for all s.
Case G,ψ: Assume
p
(Γ, ψ)
q
s = pΓ q s * pφq s, so that by IH on Γ have (0)
piLM
y
x :
p
Γ yx
q
(s yx ) and by the IH on ψ have (1) piRM
y
x :
p
ψ yx
q
(Γ yx ). Then by
conjunction of (0) and (1) have M yx :
p
Γ, ψ yx
q
(s yx ) as desired.
The formula and game cases employ the following simplification using the
context case. Each case first assumes (A1) a sequent of shape pΓ q s → pφq s
then exhibits a sequent of shape
p
Γ yx
q
(s yx )→ pQq (s yx ), the first step of which
is to assume (A2)
p
Γ yx
q
(s yx ). From (A2), uniform renaming on contexts yields
(by Lemma 31) pΓ q s, then by modus ponens on (A1) have pφq s. That is, the
remaining cases are free to ignore the context Γ .
Also, we write z yx as shorthand for a variable which is z in the case z /∈ {x, y},
or y when z = x, or x when z = y.
We give the formula cases.
Case 〈α〉φ: Assume p〈α〉φq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α yx 〉〉 pφq yx s yx = 〈〈α yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx =
p〈α〉φq s yx
Case [α]φ, have
p
[α]φ
q
s = [[α]] pφq s = [[α yx ]]
pφq yx s
y
x = [[α
y
x ]]
p
φ yx
q
s yx =
p
[α]φ
q
s yx
Case f ∼ g: follows from Lemma 24: pf ∼ gq s = f s ∼ g s = (f yx ) (s yx ) ∼
(g yx ) (s
y
x ) =
p
(f ∼ g) yxq (s yx )
We give the Angel cases.
Case z := f, have 〈〈z := f〉〉 pφq s = pφq(set s z (f s)) = pφ yxq (set s z (f s)) yx =
p
φ yx
q
(set (s yx ) (z
y
x ) (f s)) =
p
φ yx
q
(set (s yx ) (z
y
x ) (f
y
x s
y
x )) = 〈〈z yx := f yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx =
〈〈z := f yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx
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Case x := ∗, have
〈〈z := ∗〉〉 pφq s
=Σv : S. pφq(set s z v)
=Σv : S.
p
φ yx
q
(set s z v) yx
=Σv : S.
p
φ yx
q
(set (s yx ) (z
y
x ) v)
=〈〈z yx := ∗〉〉 pφ yxq s yx
=〈〈{z := ∗} yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx
Case ?ψ, have 〈〈?ψ〉〉 pφq s = pψq s * pφq s = pψ yxq s yx * pφy q s yx = 〈〈?ψ yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx
Case sol, s, d  z′ = f, have
(sol, s, d  z′ = f)
=(s z = sol 0) *Πr : [0, d]. ((sol)′ r = f (set s z (sol r)))
=(s yx z
y
x = sol 0) *Πr : [0, d]. ((sol)
′ r = f yx ((set s z (sol r))
y
x ))
=(s yx z
y
x = sol 0) *Πr : [0, d]. ((sol)
′ r = f yx (set s (z
y
x ) (sol r))) = (sol, s
y
x , d  z
y
x
′
= f yx )
Case z′ = f &ψ, have
〈〈z′ = f &ψ〉〉 pφq s
=Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R. (sol, s, d  z′ = f)
*(Πt : [0, d]. pφq (set s z (sol t)))
* pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
=Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R. (sol, s yx , d  z yx ′ = f yx )
*(Πt : [0, d].
p
φ yx
q
(set s z (sol t)) yx )
*
p
φ yx
q
((set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))) yx )
=Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R. (sol, s yx , d  z yx ′ = f yx )
*(Πt : [0, d].
p
φ yx
q
(set s yx z
y
x (sol t)))
*
p
φ yx
q
(set s yx (z, z
′) (sol d, f (set s z (sol d))))
Case α;β, have 〈〈α;β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 pφq) s = 〈〈α〉〉 (λt. 〈〈β〉〉 pφq t) s =
〈〈α yx 〉〉 (λt. 〈〈β yx 〉〉 pφ yxq t) s yx = 〈〈α yx 〉〉 ((〈〈β〉〉 pφq) yx ) s yx = 〈〈α;β yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx
Case α∪β, have 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s+〈〈β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx +
〈〈β yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx = 〈〈α ∪ β yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx
Case α∗ Note (0) (µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (φ t→ τ ′ t) *(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) yx =
(µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (φ yx t→ τ ′ t yx ) *(〈〈α yx 〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) which can be proven
by an inner induction. Likewise 〈〈α∗〉〉 pφq s = (µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (φ t →
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τ ′ t) *(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) s = (µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (φ yx t yx → τ ′ t yx ) *(〈〈α yx 〉〉 τ ′ t→
τ ′ t)) yx s
y
x , by induction on the membership of s in the fixed point. This simplifies
to 〈〈α∗ yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx as desired.
Case αd, have 〈〈αd〉〉 pφq s = [[α]] pφq s = [[α yx ]] pφ yxq s yx = 〈〈αd yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx
We give the Demon cases.
Case x := f, have [[z := f ]] pφq s = pφq(set s z (f s)) = pφ yx
q
(set s z (f s)) yx =
p
φ yx
q
(set (s yx ) (z
y
x ) (f s)) =
p
φ yx
q
(set (s yx ) (z
y
x ) (f
y
x s
y
x )) = [[z
y
x := f
y
x ]]
p
φ yx
q
s yx =
[[{z := f} yx ]] pφ yxq s yx
Case x := ∗, have
[[z := ∗]] pφq s
=Πv : S. pφq(set s z v)
=Πv : S.
p
φ yx
q
(set s z v) yx
=Πv : S.
p
φ yx
q
(set (s yx ) (z
y
x ) v)
=[[z yx := ∗]] pφ yxq s yx
=[[{z := ∗} yx ]] pφ yxq s yx
Case ?φ, have [[?ψ]] pφq s = (pψq s → pφq s) = (pψ yxq s yx → pφy q s yx ) =
[[?ψ yx ]]
p
φ yx
q
s yx
Case y′ = g&ψ: From (A2) have (L1) x 6= y and (L2) y /∈ FV(g). Note
that this is a stronger admissibility condition than those for y := g and y := ∗.
Unlike the former constructs, y is always a free variable of y′ = g&ψ, thus
if we attempted to define a sufficient admissibility condition to support the
case x = y, we would find it unsatisfiable. Thus we simply say x cannot be
substituted into f in any ODE which binds x. So (L1) (L2), then have (S)
(y := g)
f
x = x := (g
f
x) also, from (L2) have (*) (f s) = (f (set s y (g
f
x s))) by
Lemma 23 since s = (set s y (gfx s)) on {y}{ ⊇ FV(f){. then
Have (0) (sol, sfx, d  y′ = g) = (sol, s, d  (y′ = g)
f
x) by the “solves” IH.
Have (1) for all t ∈ [0, d], pψq (set (sfx) y (sol t)) = pψfxq (set s y (sol t))
by IH on ψ and because set (sfx) y (sol t) = set (set s x (f s)) y (sol t) =
set (set s y (sol t)) x (f s) = set (set s y (sol t)) x (f (set s y (sol t))) since by
(L2) have y /∈ FV(f) thus s = (set s y (sol t)) on FV(f){ and Lemma 23 applies.
Have (2)
pφq (set (sfx) (y, y
′) (sol d, f (set (sfx) y (sol d))))
=
p
φfx
q
(set s (y, y′) (sol d, f (set (sfx) y (sol d))))
by the IH on φ and because
set (sfx) (y, y
′) (sol d, g (set (sfx) y (sol d)))
=set (set s (y, y′) (sol d, g (set (sfx) y (sol d)))) x (f (set s y (sol d)))
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by the same argument as above and because g (set (sfx) y (sol d)) = (g
f
x) (set s y (sol d))
by term IH.
[[y′ = g&ψ]] pφqsfx
=Πd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, sfx, d  y′ = g)
→(Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set sfx y (sol t)))
→pφq (set (sfx) (y, y′) (sol d, g (set (sfx) y (sol d))))
=0,1,2Πd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  (y′ = g)fx)
→(Πt : [0, d]. pψfx
q
(set s y (sol t)))
→pφfx
q
(set s (y, y′) (sol d, (gfx) (set s y (sol d))))
=[[(y′ = g&ψ)fx]]
p
φfx
q
s
Case α;β, have [[α;β]] pφq s = [[α]] (〈〈β〉〉 pφq) s = [[α]] (λt. [[β]] pφq t) s =
[[α yx ]] (λt. [[β
y
x ]]
p
φ yx
q
t) s yx = [[α
y
x ]] (([[β]]
pφq) yx ) s
y
x = [[α;β
y
x ]]
p
φ yx
q
s yx
Case α ∪ β, have
[[α ∪ β]] pφq s
=[[α]] pφq s *[[β]] pφq s
=[[α yx ]]
p
φ yx
q
s yx
*[[β yx ]]
p
φ yx
q
s yx
=[[α ∪ β yx ]] pφ yxq s yx
Case α∗ Note (0) (ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t→ [[α]] τ ′ t) *(τ ′ t→ pφq t)) yx =
(ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t→ [[α yx ]] τ ′ t) *(τ ′ t→ pφ yxq t)) which can be proven
by an inner coinduction. Likewise [[α∗]] pφq s = (ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t →
[[α]] τ ′ t) *(τ ′ t→ pφq t)) s = (ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t→ [[α yx ]] τ ′ t) *(τ ′ t→
p
φ yx
q
t))s yx , by coinduction on the membership of s in the fixed point. This
simplifies to [[α∗ yx ]]
p
φ yx
q
s yx as desired.
Case αd, have [[αd]] pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α yx 〉〉 pφ yxq s yx = [[αd yx ]] pφ yxq s yx
Lemma 34 (Formula substitution). If pΓ q s ` M : pφq s and the substitu-
tions Γ fx and φ
f
x are admissible, then Γ
f
x s `Mfx s : pφfxq s. Likewise for contexts
Γ and the predicate (sol, s, d  y′ = g).
Lemma 35 (Game substitution). If the substitutions Γ fx and α
f
x φ
f
x are ad-
missible, then
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– pΓ q (sfx) `M (sfx) :〈〈α〉〉 φ (sfx) iff pΓ fx q s `Mfx s :〈〈αfx〉〉 φfx s.
– pΓ q (sfx) `M (sfx) :[[α]] φ (sfx) iff pΓ fx q s `Mfx s :[[αfx]] φfx s.
where sfx is shorthand for set s x (f s).
Proof of Lemma 34 and Lemma 35. In the formula cases, we assume (A0) pΓ q s
`M : pφq s, (A1) admissibility of Γ fx and (A2) admissibility of φfx. Likewise for,
contexts, games, and predicate (sol, s, d  x′ = f). We note that in each case, the
admissibility conditions of the IH hold following (A1) and (A2) and unpacking
the inductive definition of admissibility. As usual, we also ignore the contexts
in the formula and game cases since the cases with contexts follow easily from
those without, combined with IH’s on the contexts.
We give the context cases first.
Case Γ = ·, then trivially p·q sfx.
Case Γ, ψ: From (A0) have pΓ q sfx and
pψq sfx, then by the IH’s have
p
Γ fx
q
s
and
p
ψfx
q
s giving
p
(Γ, ψ)
f
x
q
s as desired.
We now give the formula cases.
Case f ∼ g: From (A0) by Lemma 25 have pg ∼ hq sfx = (g sfx ∼ h sfx) =
(gfx s ∼ hfx s) = ((g ∼ h)fx) s
Case [α]φ: From (A0) have by the IH on α that
p
[α]φ
q
sfx = [[α]]
pφq sfx =
[[αfx]]
p
φfx
q
s =
p
([α]φ)
f
x
q
s
Case 〈α〉φ: From (A0) have by the IH on α that p〈α〉φq sfx = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq sfx =
〈〈αfx〉〉 pφfxq s =
p〈α〉φfx
q
s
Case (sol, s, d  y′ = g): From (A2) have (L1) x 6= y and (L2) y /∈ FV(f).
Have (0) (sfx) y = s y by (L1). Have (1) for all r ∈ [0, d] that g (set (sfx) y (sol r)) =
(gfx) (set s y (sol r)) by Lemma 23 and because (set (s
f
x) y (sol r)) = (set s y (sol r))
f
x
since by (L2) s = set s y (sol r) on {y}{ ⊇ FV(f){ thus Lemma 23 applies. Have
(sol, sfx, d  y′ = g)
=((sfx) y = sol 0 *Πr : [0, d]. ((sol)
′ r = g (set (sfx) y (sol r))))
=0,1(s y = sol 0 *Πr : [0, d]. ((sol)
′ r = (gfx) (set s y (sol r))))
=(sol, s, d  (y′ = g)fx)
We give the Angel cases.
Case y := g, from (A2) have either (L1) x 6= y and (L2) y /∈ FV(f) or (R1)
x = y and (R2) x /∈ FV(φ). In the first case, (L1) (L2), then (S) (y := g)fx =
x := (gfx) also, from (L2) have (*) (f s) = (f (set s y (g
f
x s))) by Lemma 23 since
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s = (set s y (gfx s)) on {y}{ ⊇ FV(f){. Then
〈〈y := g〉〉 pφq sfx
=pφq (set (sfx) y (g (s
f
x)))
=pφq (set (set s y (g (sfx))) x (f s))
=pφq (set (set s y (gfx s)) x (f s))
=∗pφq (set (set s y (gfx s)) x (f (set s y (g
f
x s))))
=
IH
p
φfx
q
(set s y (gfx s))
=〈〈y := gfx〉〉
p
φfx
q
s
In the second case, (R1) (R2), note (*) for every t have t = tfx on FV(φ) (since
x /∈ FV(φ) by R2) by Lemma 23.
Then 〈〈y := g〉〉 pφq sfx = 〈〈x := g〉〉 pφq sfx = pφq (set (sfx) x (g (sfx))) =
pφq (set s x (g (sfx))) =∗
pφq (set s x (g sfx))
f
x
=
IH
p
φfx
q
(set s x (g sfx)) =
p
(φfx)
q
(set s x (g (set s x (f s)))) =
p
(φfx)
q
(set s x ((gfx) s)) = 〈〈x := (gfx)〉〉 φfx s =
〈〈{x := g}fx〉〉 φfx s = 〈〈{y := g}fx〉〉 φfx s
Case y := ∗: From (A2) have either (L1) x 6= y and (L2) y /∈ FV(f) or
(R1) x = y and (R2) x /∈ FV(φ). In both cases, then (S) {y := ∗}fx = y :=
∗. In case (L) then 〈〈y := ∗〉〉 pφq sfx = Σv : R. pφq (set (sfx) y v) = Σv :
R. pφq (set (set s x (f s)) y v) =L1 Σv : R. pφq (set (set s y v) x (f s))) =L2
Σv : R. pφq (set (set s y v) x (f (set s y v)))) = Σv : R. pφfx
q
(set s y v) =
〈〈y := ∗〉〉 pφfxq s =S 〈〈{y := ∗}fx〉〉
p
φfx
q
s
In case (R1) (R2) then note (*) for every t have t = tfx on FV(φ) (since
x /∈ FV(φ) by R2) by Lemma 23. then 〈〈y := ∗〉〉 pφq sfx = 〈〈x := ∗〉〉 pφq sfx = Σv :
R. pφq (set (sfx) x v) = Σv : R.
pφq (set s x v) =∗ Σv : R. pφq (set s x v)fx
=
IH Σv :
R. pφfx
q
(set s x v) = 〈〈x := ∗〉〉 pφfxq s =R1 〈〈y := ∗〉〉 pφfxq s =S 〈〈y := ∗fx〉〉 pφfxq s.
Case ?ψ, have 〈〈?ψ〉〉 pφq sfx = pψq sfx * pφqsfx = pψfxq s * pφfxq s = 〈〈?ψfx〉〉pφfxq s
Case y′ = g&ψ: From (A2) have (L1) x 6= y and (L2) y /∈ FV(f). Note
that this is a stronger admissibility condition than those for y := f and y := ∗.
Unlike the former constructs, y is always a free variable of y′ = g&ψ, thus
if we attempted to define a sufficient admissibility condition to support the
case x = y, we would find it unsatisfiable. Thus we simply say x cannot be
substituted into f in any ODE which binds x. So (L1) (L2), then have (S)
(y := g)
f
x = x := (g
f
x) also, from (L2) have (*) (f s) = (f (set s y (g
f
x s))) by
Lemma 23 since s = (set s y (gfx s)) on {y}{ ⊇ FV(f){. then
Have (0) (sol, sfx, d  y′ = g) = (sol, s, d  (y′ = g)
f
x) by the “solves” IH.
Have (1) for all t ∈ [0, d], pψq (set (sfx) y (sol t)) = pψfxq (set s y (sol t))
by IH on ψ and because set (sfx) y (sol t) = set (set s x (f s)) y (sol t) =
set (set s y (sol t)) x (f s) = set (set s y (sol t)) x (f (set s y (sol t))) since by
(L2) have y /∈ FV(f) thus s = (set s y (sol t)) on FV(f){ and Lemma 23 applies.
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Have (2)
pφq (set (sfx) (y, y
′) (sol d, g (set (sfx) y (sol d))))
=
p
φfx
q
(set s (y, y′) (sol d, gfx (set s y (sol d))))
by the IH on φ and because
set (sfx) y (sol d)
= set (set y (sol d) ) x (f (set s y (sol d)))
by the same argument as above and by term case because (set (sfx) y (sol d)) =
(set s y (sol d))fx.
〈〈y′ = g&ψ〉〉 pφqsfx
=Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, sfx, d  y′ = g)
*(Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set sfx y (sol t)))
* pφq (set (sfx) (y, y
′) (sol d, g (set (sfx) y (sol d))))
=0,1,2Σd : R≥0. Σsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  (y′ = g)fx)
*(Πt : [0, d].
p
ψfx
q
(set s y (sol t)))
*
p
φfx
q
(set s (y, y′) (sol d, gfx (set s y (sol d))))
=〈〈(y′ = g&ψ)fx〉〉
p
φfx
q
s
Case α;β, have 〈〈α;β〉〉 pφq sfx = 〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 pφq) sfx = 〈〈α〉〉 (p〈β〉φq) sfx =
〈〈αfx〉〉 (
p〈β〉φfx
q
) s = 〈〈αfx〉〉 (〈〈βfx 〉〉 pφfxq) s = 〈〈{α;β}fx〉〉
p
φfx
q
s
Case α∪β, have 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 pφq sfx = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq sfx +〈〈β〉〉 pφq sfx = 〈〈αfx〉〉 pφfxqs +〈〈βfx 〉〉 pφfxqs =
〈〈{α ∪ β}fx〉〉
p
φfx
q
s
Case α∗: The main step (*) holds by inner induction on the membership of
sfx in the fixed point. The two fixed point solutions τ
′ and τ ′′ are related by τ ′ sfx
iff τ ′′s for all s : S.
In the base case, (ψ sfx → τ ′ sfx) = (ψ sfx → τ ′′ s) = (ψfx s→ τ ′′ s).
In the inductive case, (〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ sfx → τ ′ sfx) = (〈〈αfx〉〉 τ ′′ s → τ ′ sfx) =
(〈〈αfx〉〉 τ ′′ s→ τ ′′ s).
Then the main proof of the case proceeds:
〈〈α∗〉〉 pφq sfx = (µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (ψ t→ τ ′ t) *(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) (sfx) =∗
(µτ ′′ : (S→ T). λt : S (ψfx t→ τ ′′ t) *(〈〈αfx〉〉 τ ′′ t→ τ ′′ t)) (sfx) = 〈〈α∗fx〉〉 pφfxq s.
Case αd, have 〈〈αd〉〉 pφq sfx = [[α]] pφq sfx
=
IH [[αfx]]
p
φfx
q
s = 〈〈(αfx)d〉〉 pφfxq s =
〈〈{αd}fx〉〉
p
φfx
q
s
We give the Demon cases.
50 B. Bohrer and A. Platzer
Case y := g, From (A2) have either (L1) x 6= y and (L2) y /∈ FV(f) or (R1)
x = y and (R2) x /∈ FV(φ).
In the first case, (L1) (L2), then (S) {y := g}fx = {x := (gfx)}. Also, from
(L2), have (*) (f s) = (f (set s y (gfx s))) by Lemma 23 since s = (set s y (g
f
x s))
on {y}{ ⊇ FV(f){ thus
[[y := g]] pφq sfx
=pφq (set (sfx) y (g (s
f
x)))
=pφq (set (set s y (g (sfx))) x (f s))
=pφq (set (set s y (gfx s)) x (f s))
=∗pφq (set (set s y (gfx s)) x (f (set s y (g
f
x s))))
=
IH
p
φfx
q
(set s y (gfx s))
=[[y := gfx]]
p
φfx
q
s
In the second case, (R1) (R2), note (*) for every t have t = tfx on FV(φ) (since
x /∈ FV(φ) by R2) by Lemma 23.
Then [[y := g]] pφq sfx = [[x := g]]
pφq sfx =
pφq (set (sfx) x (g (s
f
x))) =
pφq (set s x (g (sfx))) =∗
pφq (set s x (g sfx))
f
x
=
IH
p
φfx
q
(set s x (g sfx)) =
p
(φfx)
q
(set s x (g (set s x f s))) =
p
(φfx)
q
(set s x ((gfx) s)) = [[x := (g
f
x)]] φ
f
x s =
[[(x := g)
f
x]] φ
f
x s = [[(y := g)
f
x]] φ
f
x s
Case x := ∗: From (A2) have either (L1) x 6= y and (L2) y /∈ FV(f) or
(R1) x = y and (R2) x /∈ FV(φ). In both cases, then (S) {y := ∗}fx = {y :=
∗}. In case (L) then [[y := ∗]] pφq sfx = (Πv : R. pφq (set (sfx) y v)) = (Πv :
R. pφq (set (set s x (f s)) y v)) =L1 (Πv : R. pφq (set (set s y v) x (f s))) =L2
(Πv : R. pφq (set (set s y v) x (f (set s y v)))) = (Πv : R. pφfx
q
(set s y v)) =
[[y := ∗]] pφfxq s =S [[y := ∗fx]] pφfxq s
In case (R1) (R2) then note (*) for every t have t = tfx on FV(φ) (since
x /∈ FV(φ) by R2) by Lemma 23. then [[y := ∗]] pφq sfx = [[x := ∗]] pφq sfx = (Πv :
R. pφq (set (sfx) x v)) = (Πv : R.
pφq (set s x v)) =∗ (Πv : R. pφq (set s x v)fx)
=
IH
(Πv : R. pφfx
q
(set s x v)) = [[x := ∗]] pφfxq s =R1 [[y := ∗]] pφfxq s =S [[y := ∗fx]] pφfxq s.
Case ?φ, have [[?ψ]] pφq sfx = (
pψq sfx → pφqsfx) = (pψfxq s → pφfxq s) =
[[?ψfx]]
p
φfx
q
s
Case z′ = f &ψ: From (A2) have (L1) x 6= y and (L2) y /∈ FV(f) (there is
no x = y case). In the sole case, (L1) (L2), then (S) {y := g}fx = {x := (gfx)}
also, from (L2) have (*) (f s) = (f (set s y (gfx s))) by Lemma 23 since s =
(set s y (gfx s)) on {y}{ ⊇ FV(f){. then
Have (0) (sol, sfx, d  y′ = g) = (sol, s, d  (y′ = g)
f
x) by the “solves” IH.
Have (1) for all t ∈ [0, d], pψq (set (sfx) y (sol t)) = pψfxq (set s y (sol t))
by IH on ψ and because set (sfx) y (sol t) = set (set s x (f s)) y (sol t) =
set (set s y (sol t)) x (f s) = set (set s y (sol t)) x (f (set s y (sol t))) since by
(L2) have y /∈ FV(f) thus s = (set s y (sol t)) on FV(f){ and Lemma 23 applies.
Constructive Hybrid Games 51
Have (2)
pφq (set (sfx) (y, y
′) (sol d, g (set (sfx) y (sol d))))
=
p
φfx
q
(set s (y, y′) (sol d, gfx (set s y (sol d))))
by the IH on φ and because
set (sfx) y (sol d)
=set (set s y (sol d)) x (f (set s y (sol d)))
by the same argument as above and by term case because (set (sfx) y (sol d)) =
(set s y (sol d))fx.
[[y′ = g&ψ]] pφqsfx
=Πd : R≥0. Πsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, sfx, d  y′ = g)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set sfx y (sol t)))
→ pφq (set (sfx) (y, y′) (sol d, g (set (sfx) y (sol d))))
=0,1,2Πd : R≥0. Πsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  (y′ = g)fx)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pψfx
q
(set s y (sol t)))
→ pφfx
q
(set s (y, y′) (sol d, gfx (set s y (sol d))))
=[[(y′ = g&ψ)fx]]
p
φfx
q
s
Case α;β, have [[α;β]] pφq sfx = [[α]] ([[β]]
pφq) sfx = [[α]] (
p
[β]φ
q
) sfx =
[[αfx]] (
p
[β]φ
f
x
q
) s = [[αfx]] ([[β
f
x ]]
p
φfx
q
) s = [[{α;β}fx]]
p
φfx
q
s
Case α∪β, have [[α ∪ β]] pφq sfx = [[α]] pφq sfx *[[β]] pφq sfx = [[αfx]] pφfxq s *[[βfx ]] pφfxq s =
[[{α ∪ β}fx]]
p
φfx
q
s
Case α∗: The main step (*) holds by inner coinduction on the membership
of sfx in the fixed point. The two fixed point solutions τ
′ and τ ′′ are related by
τ ′ sfx iff τ
′′ s for all s : S.
In the base case by IH on ψ, (τ ′ sfx → ψ sfx) = (τ ′′ s→ ψ sfx) = (τ ′′ s→ ψfx s).
In the coinductive case, by IH on α, have (τ ′ sfx → [[α]] τ ′ sfx) = (τ ′′ s →
[[α]] τ ′ sfx) = (τ
′′ s→ [[αfx]] τ ′′ s).
Then the main proof of the case proceeds:
[[α∗]] pφq sfx = (ρτ
′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t→ [[α]] τ ′ t) *(τ ′ t→ pψq t)) (sfx) =∗
(ρτ ′′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′′ t→ [[αfx]] τ ′′ t) *(τ ′′ t→ pψfxq t)) s = [[α∗fx]] pφfxq s.
Case αd, have [[αd]] pφq sfx = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq sfx = 〈〈αfx〉〉 pφfxq s = [[(αfx)d]] pφfxq s =
[[{αd}fx]]
p
φfx
q
s
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Theorem 36 (Soundness of Proof Calculus). If Γ ` φ is provable then
Γ ` φ is valid. As a corollary when Γ = ·, if φ is provable, then φ is valid.
Proof. Each case proceeds by fixing s : S and assuming (A) pΓ q s. In cases
where premisses include Γ, we assume that modus ponens has been applied
to all premisses with (A). Additional antecedents beyond Γ will be explicitly
discharged in each caes.
Case [∪]I: Assume premisses (0) Γ ` [α]φ and (1) Γ ` [β]φ then by the IH’s
have (0A)
p
[α]φ
q
s and (1A)
p
[β]φ
q
s, which expand to (0B) [[α]] pφq s and (1B)
[[β]] pφq s, so that by conjunction [[α]] pφq s *[[β]] pφq s, i.e., [[α ∪ β]] pφq s =
p
[α ∪ β]φq s.
Case [∪]E1: From premiss, have (0) Γ ` [α ∪ β]φ, by IH have (0A) p[α ∪ β]φq s,
which expands to [[α ∪ β]] pφq s = [[α]] pφq s *[[β]] pφq s, whose left projection
is [[α]] pφq s = p[α]φq s.
Case [∪]E2: From premiss, have (0) Γ ` [α ∪ β]φ, by IH have (0A) p[α ∪ β]φq s,
which expands to [[α ∪ β]] pφq s = [[α]] pφq s *[[β]] pφq s, whose right projection
is [[β]] pφq s = p[β]φq s.
Case 〈∪〉E: Assume (0) Γ ` 〈α ∪ β〉φ and (1) Γ, 〈α〉φ ` ψ and (2) Γ, 〈β〉φ
` ψ.
By the IH’s, have
(0A)
p〈α ∪ β〉φq s and (1A) p〈α〉φ→ ψq s and (2A) p〈β〉φ→ ψq s, which
expand to (0B) 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s +〈〈β〉〉 pφq s and (1B) 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s→
pψq s and (2B) 〈〈β〉〉 pφq s→ pψq s,
From (0B) have two cases: (L) 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s or (R) 〈〈β〉〉 pφq s. In the first case,
apply (1B) to (L), yielding pψq s, or in the second case, apply (2B) to (R), also
yielding pψq s in each case as desired.
Case 〈∪〉I1: Assume (0) Γ ` 〈α〉φ. By IH, (0A) p〈α〉φq s, which expands to
(0B) 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s then by left injection, 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s +〈〈β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 pφq s =
p〈α ∪ β〉φq s.
Case 〈∪〉I2: Assume (0) Γ ` 〈β〉φ. By IH, (0A) p〈β〉φq s, which expands to
(0B) 〈〈β〉〉 pφq s, then by right injection, 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s +〈〈β〉〉 pφq s = 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 pφq s =
p〈α ∪ β〉φq s.
Case 〈?〉I: Assume (0) Γ ` φ and (1) Γ ` ψ. By IH, (0A) pφq s and (1A)
pψq s, i.e., 〈〈?φ〉〉 pψq s = p〈?φ〉ψq s.
Case 〈?〉E1: Assume (0) Γ ` 〈?φ〉ψ, so by IH, (0A) p〈?φ〉ψq s, which expands
to (0B) 〈〈?φ〉〉 pψq s = pφq s*pψq s whose left projection is pφq s as desired.
Case 〈?〉E2: Assume (0) Γ ` 〈?φ〉ψ, so by IH, (0A) p〈?φ〉ψq s, which expands
to (0B) 〈〈?φ〉〉 pψq s = pφq s*pψq s whose right projection is likewise pψq s as
desired.
Case [?]I: Assume (0) Γ, φ ` ψ. By IH, (0A) pφq s→ pψq s, i.e., [[?φ]] pψq s
which is
p
[?φ]ψ
q
s.
Case [?]E: Assume (0) Γ ` [?φ]ψ and (1) Γ ` φ. By the IH’s, have (0A)
p
[?φ]ψ
q
= [[?φ]] pψq s = pφq s→ pψq s and (1A) pφq s. By modus ponens have
pψq s.
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Case hyp: The side condition says conclusion φ satisifies φ ∈ Γ . Then as-
sumption (A) is pΓ q s = *i∈|Γ |
pψi
q s = pψ1
q s* · · · *pφq s* · · · *pψ|Γ |q s for some
ψi for i ∈ [1, |Γ |]. By projection, pφq s as desired.
Case [:∗]I: WTS for all s such that (A) then p[x := ∗]φq s, which is (Πv :
R. pφq (set s x v)), so assume any v : R to prove pφq (set s x v). Since x /∈ FV(Γ )
by the side condition, then by Lemma 28 and (A) have pΓ q (set s x v), thus by
modus ponens on the premiss have pφq (set s x v) for all v, which is to say
p
[x := ∗]φq s.
Case 〈:∗〉I: From premisses have (0) Γ ` φfx for some f such that φfx is
admissible, or by IH have (0A)
p
φfx
q
s. We can apply Lemma 34 since φfx is
admissible, yielding (1) pφq (sfx). Let v = f s, so (1) simplifies to
pφq (set s x v),
thus v is a witness to Σv : R. pφq (set s x v) which is to say p〈x := ∗〉φq s.
Case 〈[;]〉I: We give the diamond case, the box case is symmetric. Assumption
gives (0) Γ ` 〈α〉〈β〉φ and by IH, (0A) p〈α〉〈β〉φq s = 〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 pφq) s =
〈〈α;β〉〉 pφq s = p〈α;β〉φq s
Case 〈[:=]〉I: We give the diamond case, the box case is symmetric. Assume
(0) Γ ` φfx so by IH (0A) pφfxq s and by Lemma 34 (since φfx admissible) then
pφq sfx =
pφq (set s x (f s)), that is p〈x := f〉φq s.
Case [:∗]E: Assumed (0) Γ ` 〈x := ∗〉φ an (1) Γ ` ∀xφ→ ψ then by the IH’s
have (0A)
p〈x := ∗〉φq s = (Σv : R. pφq (set s x v)) and (1A) p∀xφ→ ψq s =
(Πv : R. pφq (set s x v)→ pψq (set s x v))
We unpack v : R from (0A) so that pφq (set s x v) In (1A) specialize to the
same v to get pφq (set s x v) → pψq (set s x v) and, by modus ponenst with
(0A), have pψq (set s x v). By side condition that x /∈ FV(ψ), apply Lemma 28
to get pψq s.
Case 〈:∗〉E: Assume side condition φfx admissible. Assume (0) Γ ` [x := ∗]φ
so by IH (0A)
p
[x := ∗]φq s so (1) pφq (set s x v) for all v : R.
Seek to show
p
φfx
q
t in some arbitrary t. By Lemma 34 since φfx is admissible,
it suffices to show pφq(set t x (f t)). Then apply (1) letting s = t and v = (f t)
yielding pφq (set t x (f t)) as desired.
Case M: Assume (0) Γ ` 〈α〉φ and (1) Γ yBV(α) , φ ` ψ
Let x be the vector of variables xi ∈ BV(α) in some canonical (e.g. lexico-
graphic) order. Let y be a fresh vector of variables of the same length as x. Let
z be FV(Γ ) \ (BV(α)).
Recall the discrete ghost rule defined in prior work [8]:
(iG)
Γ, p : x = f ` φ
Γ ` φ (x fresh except free in M, p fresh)
Applying iG repeatedly to (1) have Γ, y = x ` 〈α〉φ. The IH applies be-
cause the context Γ, y = x is satisfied by taking assumption (A) pΓ q s and
show (AA) pΓ q (set s y x) which reflexivity satisfies y = x while preserving
Γ by Lemma 28 since definitionally y ∩ FV(Γ ) = ∅. The the IH results in
p〈α〉φq (set s y (s x)) = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq (set s y (s x)), then apply Lemma 30 with
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V = y, z giving (B) 〈〈α〉〉 (λt. pφq t * t V = s V ) (set s y (s x)) To prove the
assumption of (1) conclusion from (B), first prove a monotone lemma (Mon):
Claim (Mon). Assume pΓ q s. Then for all t : S
pφq t ∧ t V = s V implies pφ ∧ Γ yBV(α)q t
Subproof. The first conjunct holds trivially from the assumption. For the latter,
decompose Γ into two contexts Γ = ∆1, ∆2 such that context ∆1 contains
formulas ψ such that FV(ψ) ∩ BV(α) = ∅, with all other formulas are in ∆2.
We have p∆1
q t from (A) by repeating Lemma 28 because for each ψ ∈ ∆1,
we have s = t on FV(ψ) as a consequent of t V = s V specifically because
V ⊇ z ⊇ FV(ψ).
Consider ∆2 next. Recall ∆2
y
BV(α) = ∧ψ∈∆2(ψ yx ). For each such ψ we appeal
s y = t y (since y ⊆ V ) and s y = s x by ghosting, thus t y = s x by transitivity.
To show the desired
p
ψ yx
q
t we note by Lemma 32 it suffices to show pψq t yx ,
which, because x ∈ FV(ψ) and y /∈ FV(ψ), reduces to pψq(set t x (s y)).
Since (AA) includes pψq (set s y x), it suffices to apply Lemma 28, providing
the assumption that on FV(ψ) ⊆ {z}∪BV(ψ) = {x, z} we have (set s y (s x)) =
(set t x (s y)). We already have s = t on y, z. Then s y is set to s x but s x = s y
anyway, a no-op. t x is set to s y = s x so that (set s y (s x)) = (set t x (s y))
agree on {x, y, z} as desired.
We observe the first assumption of (Mon) is just (A), call the resulting uni-
versally quantifier statement (Mono). By Lemma 27 on (Mono) and (B) have
〈〈α〉〉 (pφ ∧ Γ yBV(α)q) s we finally reach (Mid) 〈〈α〉〉 pφ ∧ Γ yBV(α)q (set s y (s x)).
By commuting φ and Γ yBV(α) in (Mid) we now have the precondition to apply
Lemma 27 on (1), getting 〈〈α〉〉 pψq (set s y (s x)). Lastly, y is fresh in α and φ,
so Lemma 29 gives the desired 〈〈α〉〉 pψq s.
Case 〈[d]〉I: We give the case for diamonds, the case for boxes is symmet-
ric. Assumed (0) Γ ` [α]φ, then by IH have (0A) p[α]φq s = [[α]] pφq s =
〈〈αd〉〉 pφq s = p〈αd〉φq s as desired.
Case 〈∗〉E: Have assumptions (0) Γ ` 〈α∗〉φ (1) Γ, φ ` ψ (2) Γ, 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ
` ψ so by IH have (0A) p〈α∗〉φq s (1A) pφ→ ψq s (2A) p〈α〉〈α∗〉φ→ ψq s
From (0A) and the α∗ semantics, since s belongs to the least fixed point
(µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (ψ t→ τ ′ t) *(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ s)) then we have
(3)ψ s +(〈〈α〉〉 p〈α∗〉φq s → τ ′ s), so we proceed on cases on (3). In case
(L) ψ s apply modus ponens on (1A) giving pψq s as desired. In case (R)
〈〈α〉〉 p〈α∗〉φq s → τ ′ s thus p〈α〉〈α∗〉φq s and by modus ponens on (2A) have
pψq s as desired.
Case [∗]E: Assume (0) Γ ` [α∗]φ and by IH (0A) p[α∗]φq s. Since s belongs
to the fixed point (ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t→ [[α]] τ ′ t)*(τ ′ t→ pφq t)) then
[[α]]
p
[α∗]φq s*pφq s which commutes to pφq s*[[α]] p[α∗]φq s which simplifies
to
p
φ ∧ [α][α∗]φq s.
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Case 〈∗〉S: Assume (0) Γ ` φ and by IH (0A) pφq s, thus s belongs to the
fixed point (µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (ψ t→ τ ′ t) *(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) and p〈α∗〉φq s
as desired.
Case 〈∗〉G: Assume (0) Γ ` 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ s and by IH (0A) p〈α〉〈α∗〉φq s, thus
〈〈α〉〉 p〈α∗〉φq s, thus s belongs to the fixed point (µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (ψ t →
τ ′ t) *(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ s)) and p〈α∗〉φq s as desired.
Case [∗]R: Assume (0) Γ ` φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ and by IH (0A) pφ ∧ [α][α∗]φq s so
pφq s and [[α]] p[α∗]φq s so s belongs to the fixed point (ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t→
[[α]] τ ′ t)*(τ ′ t→ pφq t))
thus
p
[α∗]φq s.
Case loop: Assume (0) Γ ` J (1) J ` [α]J . (2) J ` φ. By IH’s, have (0A)
pJq s and for all t ∈ S, (1A) pJq t → p[α]Jq t and (2A) pJq s → pφq s.
From (1A) and (2A), J is a fixed point τ ′ of the equivalence ∀t, ((τ ′ t) =
((τ ′ t → [[α]] τ ′ t)*(τ ′ t → pφq t))), and from (0A) we have that s belongs
to the fixed point J . Then s belongs also to the greatest fixed point, that is s
belongs to (ρτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (τ ′ t → [[α]] τ ′ t)*(τ ′ t → pφq t)), which is to
say
p
[α∗]φq s.
Case FP: Assume (0) Γ ` 〈α∗〉φ (1) φ ` ψ (2) 〈α〉ψ ` ψ so by IH have (0A)
p〈α∗〉φq s (1A) pφ → ψq t for all t : S (2A) p〈α〉ψ → ψq t for all t : S.
(0A) simplifies to (3) (µτ ′ : (S→ T). λt : S (φ t→ τ ′ t) *(〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ t→ τ ′ t)) s,
from which we proceed by induction on the fixed point membership of s.
In the first case, (L) φ s so by modus ponens with (1) have pψq s. In the
second case have (〈〈α〉〉 τ ′ s) where τ ′ s = pψq s, so 〈〈α〉〉 pψq s and p〈α〉ψq s
and by modus ponens on (2A) have pψq s. So in each case the conclusion pψq s
holds.
Case 〈∗〉I: Assume (0) Γ ` ϕ (1) ϕ, (0 ≺M∧M0 =M) ` 〈α〉(ϕ∧M0 M)
(2) (ϕ ∧ 0 <M) ` φ
By the IH have (0A) pϕq s and have (1A) pϕ ∧ (0 ≺M s ∧M0 =M)q t →
p〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M)q t for all t : S. and have (2A) pϕ ∧ 0 <M→ φq t for all
t : S.
By the side condition, the order  is Noetherian and satisfies the ascend-
ing chain condition. Our main proof shows that (Main) s belongs to the fixed
point
p〈α∗〉(ϕ ∧ 0 <M)q s. We proceed by induction on the value of M s; by
the ascending chain condition, this induction is well-founded. Specifically, we
show that M s decreases with every iteration α until M = 0 where the loop
terminates. Invariant ϕ is maintained in every iteration.
For the base case, (0A) gave pϕq s and by conjunction p(ϕ ∧ 0 <M)q s which
fulfills the base case of the fixed point.
In the inductive case have 0 ≺ M s, and still have assumption pϕq s. In-
troduce a fresh discrete ghost (rule iG) M0 = M s. We from (1A) have the
following fact
p
ϕ ∧ (M ≺M s ∧M0 =M)q (set s M0 (M s)) by Lemma 28
since M0 was fresh. By modus ponens, (1A) yields (4) p〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M)q s.
Since every point t satisfying
p
(ϕ ∧M0 M)q t trivially has a lesser value of
M than s, we can apply the IH on region p(ϕ ∧M0 M)q, yielding for all t
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that
p
(ϕ ∧M0 M)q t → p〈α∗〉(ϕ ∧ 0 <M)q t. Then by Lemma 27 have (5)
p〈α〉〈α∗〉(ϕ ∧ 0 M)q (set sM0 (M s)) which satisfies the inductive case, giv-
ing
p〈α∗〉(ϕ ∧ 0 M)q(set sM0 (M s)). By freshness of M0, Lemma 28 gives
p〈α∗〉(ϕ ∧ 0 M)q s. This completes the inner induction. By Lemma 27 and
(2A) have
p〈α∗〉φq s as desired.
Case DI: Assume (0) Γ ` φ (1) Γ ` ∀x (ψ → [x′ := f ](φ)′) so by IH have (I0)
pφq s and (2) for all v : R, pψq (set s x v)→ p(φ)′q (set s (x, x′) (v, f (set s x v))).
To show the conclusion, first assume d and sol such that (I1) (sol, s, d  x′ =
f) and (4) pψq (set s x (sol t)) for t ∈ [0, d] and then we conclude that (P)
pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol r, f (set s x (sol r)))). From (2) and (4) we then have
p
(φ)′q (set (set s x (sol t)) x′ (f (set s x (sol t)))) = p(φ)′q (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t))
(I2) by unpacking the definition of (sol, s, d  x′ = f) in (I1).
We now prove the conclusion (P) by induction on differentiable formula φ,
maintaining assumptions (I0), (I1), (I2) throughout the induction. Each case re-
duces to a lemma proven elsewhere in the literature. However, those prior works
appeal to the time-derivative of a term f, while our term (f)′ is a spatial deriva-
tive. Our Lemma 26 shows that these derivatives are equal in the postcondition
of an ODE, thus the lemmas are applicable.
Case g = h: Let G(t) = g (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)) and H(t) =
h (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)). In this case (I0) specializes to g s = h s so (Init)
G(0) = H(0) since sol 0 = s x by (I1) and Lemma 28 since x′ /∈ FV(g)∪FV(h).
Then, (I2) specializes for all t ∈ [0, d] to (g)′ (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)) =
(h)′ (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)), that is (EqT) G′(t) = H ′(t) for t ∈ [0, d].
Apply the = case of Theorem 21 to (Init) and (EqT) on interval [0, d], thus
G(t) = H(t) for t ∈ [0, d]. Therefore (Post) pg = hq (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)).
Since (Post) holds under the assumptions (I1) and (4) then
p
[x′ = f &ψ]g = hq s
as desired.
Case g > h: Let F (t) = g (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t))−h (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)).
In this case (I0) specializes to g s > h s so (Init) F (0) > 0 since sol 0 = s x
by (I1) and Lemma 28 since x′ /∈ FV(g) ∪ FV(h). Then, (I2) specializes for all
t ∈ [0, d] to (g)′ (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)) > (h)′ (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)),
so that (GrT) F ′(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, d]. Apply the > case of Theorem 21 to (Init)
and (GrT) on interval [0, d], thus F (d) > F (0) so by transitivity with (Init),
have F (d) > 0 so (Post) pg > hq (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)). Since (Post) holds
under the assumptions (I1) and (4) then
p
[x′ = f &ψ]g > hq s as desired.
Case g ≥ h: Let F (t) = g (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t))−h (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)).
In this case (I0) specializes to g s ≥ h s so (Init) F (0) ≥ 0 since sol 0 = s x
by (I1) and Lemma 28 since x′ /∈ FV(g) ∪ FV(h). Then, (I2) specializes for all
t ∈ [0, d] to (g)′ (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)) ≥ (h)′ (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)),
so that (GeqT) F ′(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, d]. Apply the ≥ case of Theorem 21 to (Init)
and (GeqT) on interval [0, d], thus F (d) ≥ F (0) so by transitivity with (Init),
have F (d) ≥ 0 so (Post) pg ≥ hq (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)). Since (Post) holds
under the assumptions (I1) and (4) then
p
[x′ = f &ψ]g ≥ hq s as desired.
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Case φ1 ∧ φ2: In this case (I0) specializes to pφ1 ∧ φ2q s so (L0) pφ1q s
and (R0) pφ2
q s. Then since (φ1 ∧ φ2)′ = (φ1)′ ∧ (φ2)′ we also have (L2)
p
(φ1)
′q (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)) and (R2) p(φ2)′
q
(set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)).
By the IH on (L0) (I1) (L2) and have (IHL)
p
[x′ = f &ψ]φ1
q
s. By the IH on (R0)
(I1) (R2) and then we have (IHR)
p
[x′ = f &ψ]φ2
q
s. By applying assumptions
(I1) and (4) to (IHL) and (IHR) have (L3) pφ1
q (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)) and
(R3) pφ2
q (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)) so (LR) pφ1 ∧ φ2q (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t))
thus
p
[x′ = f &ψ](φ1 ∧ φ2)q s as desired.
Case φ1∨φ2: Since by definition (φ1∨φ2)′ = (φ1)′∧ (φ2)′ then we have (L2)
p
(φ1)
′q (set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)) and (R2) p(φ2)′
q
(set s (x, x′) (sol t, (sol)′ t)).
By the IH on (I1) (L2) have (IHL) pφ1
q s → p[x′ = f &ψ]φ1q s. By the IH on
(I1) (R2) have (IHR) pφ2
q s → p[x′ = f &ψ]φ2q s. In this case (I0) special-
izes to pφ1 ∨ φ2q s, proceed by cases. First case: (L0) pφ1q s, by (IHL) have
p
[x′ = f &ψ]φ1
q
s thus
p
[x′ = f &ψ](φ1 ∨ φ2)q s and p[x′ = f &ψ](φ1 ∨ φ2)q s.
Second case: (R0) pφ2
q s, by (IHR) have p[x′ = f &ψ]φ2
q
s thus
p
[x′ = f &ψ](φ1 ∨ φ2)q s
and
p
[x′ = f &ψ](φ1 ∨ φ2)q s.
Case DC: Assume (0) Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]ρ and (1) Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ ∧ ρ]φ so
by IH have (0A)
p
[x′ = f &ψ]ρq s and (1A) p[x′ = f &ψ ∧ ρ]φq s. To show the
conclusion, first assume a duration d and solution sol such that (S) (sol, s, d 
x′ = f) and (C) (Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t))) after which we show that (P)
pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol t)))). Because “solves” and universal
quantification are prefix-closed, we also have: (S0) (sol, s, r  x′ = f) for all
r ∈ [0, d] (C0) (Πt : [0, r]. pψq (set s x (sol t))) for all r ∈ [0, d]. Thus apply (S0)
and (C0) to (0) for each r ∈ [0, d], getting
(2) pρq (set s (x, x′) (sol r, f (set s x (sol r)))) for all r ∈ [0, d]. Since ρ appears
in a domain constraint, we must have x′ /∈ FV(ρ) by syntactic restriction, so by
Lemma 28 have (2A) pρq (set s x (sol r)) for all r ∈ [0, d]. Conjoining (2A)
with (C) we have (CA) (Πt : [0, d]. pψ ∧ rhoq (set s x (sol t))). Applying (S)
and (CA) to (1) we have (P) pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol r, f (set s x (sol r)))) as
desired.
Case DW: By assumption we have (0) Γ ` ∀(x, x′) (ψ → φ) so by IH have
(0A) pψ → φq (set s (x, x′) (v, v′)) for all v, v′ ∈ R. To show [x′ = f &ψ]φ assume
some d > 0 and sol : [0, d] → R such that (1) (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and (2)
pψq (set s x (sol t)) for t ∈ [0, d] and then show pφq (set s x (sol d)) For each
t we can apply Lemma 28 in (2) because x′ /∈ FV(ψ) by syntactic restriction,
giving (3) pψq (set s (x, x′) (sol t, f (set s x (sol t)))) s. Apply (3) to (0A) have
pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol t, f (set s x (sol t)))) as desired.
Case DG: Assume the side conditions that y is fresh and that a, b are con-
tinuous. Assume (0) Γ ` ∃y [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]φ then by IH (0A)
p∃y [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]φq s. Unpack v : R such that we will have
(0B)
p
[x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]φq (set s y v). To show p[x′ = f &ψ]φq s
first assume d and sol are such that (1) (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and (2) (Πt :
[0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t))) to show (P) pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
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We will do so by applying (0B), which first requires constructing a solution
xysol to x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) of the same duration as sol. We construct
xysol according to form xysol(t) = (sol(t), ysol(t)) for some ysol(t) which solves
y′(t) = a(sol t)y + b(sol t). So we first construct ysol according to the initial
value problem:
ysol(0) = v
ysol′(t, vy) = a(sol(t))vy + b(sol(t))
We show that (xysol)′(t) = ((sol)′(t), (ysol)′(t)) is Lipschitz continuous in t, vy.
It is continuous because addition, multiplication, and composition preserve con-
tinuity, because a and b are continuous by the side condition, and because sol is
continuous since it is the solution of an ODE. It satisfies the Lipschitz condition
with constant
L = max
t∈[0,d]
(sol t · a(sol(t)))
where the maximum exists because it is the maximum of a continuous function
on a compact interval. Thus, Theorem 20 applies and there exists a solution ysol
on [0, d] such that (solY) (ysol, (set s y v), d  {y′ = a(sol t)y+ b(sol t)}). From
(solY) and (1) have (1XY) (xysol, (set s y v), d  {x′ = f, y′ = a(sol t)y +
b(sol t)}). From (2) have (2XY) (Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s (x, y) (xysol t))) by
Lemma 28 using the assumption that y was fresh in φ. Now we abbreviate
ss = (set (set s y v) (x, y) (xysol d)) = set s (x, y) (xysol d). Apply xysol, d,
(1XY), and (2XY) to (0A) to get pφq (set ss (x′, y′)) (f ss, (a(x)y + b(x)) ss)
from which we have (P) because piLxysol = sol and by Lemma 28 since y was
fresh in φ.
Case DV: Assume side conditions (V1) t fresh and (V2) x, x′, t, t′ not free
in d, ε. Assume (0) Γ ` 〈t := 0; {t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ}〉t ≥ d Assume (1) Γ `
[x′ = f ]((h)′ − (g)′) ≥ ε Assume (2) Γ ` d > 0 ∧ ε > 0 ∧ h − g ≥ −dε As-
sume (3) ψ, h ≥ g ` φ, then by IH have
(0A)
p〈t := 0; {t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ}〉t ≥ dq s
(1A)
p
[x′ = f ]((h)′ − (g)′) ≥ εq s
(2A)pd > 0 ∧ ε > 0 ∧ h− g ≥ −dεq s
(3A)pψ ∧ h ≥ g → φq t for all t : S
To show (P)
p〈x′ = f &ψ〉φq s it suffices to choose sol and d such that
(P0)(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
(P1)(Πt : [0, d]. pφq (set s x (sol t)))
(P2)pψq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
From (0A) unpack tsol and dur such that (B) (tsol, (set s t 0, dur  {t′ =
1, x′ = f}) and (C) (Πtt : [0, dur]. pψq (set s (t, x) (sol tt))) and also have (D)
pt ≥ dq (set s (t, x, t′, x′) ((tsol dur), (1, f (set s x (sol dur))))).
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Since (λx. x) is the unique solution of t′ = 1 we have tsol(r) = (r, sol(r)) for
some solution sol. This also yields (Dur)
dur ≥ d (set s (t, x, t′, x′) ((tsol dur), (1, f (set s x (sol dur))))) = d s by
Lemma 28 and (V2).
We project the solution for f, noting Lemma 28 applies since t /∈ FV(f) ∪
FV(ψ) ∪ FV(φ) by (V1). We get (B1) (sol, s, dur  x′ = f) and (C1) Πt :
[0, dur]. pφq (set s (x) (sol t)) and (D1) pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol dur, f (set s x (sol dur)))).
We can now instantiate (1A) with solution sol and duration dur using (B1)
and (CT1) to get (Der)
p
(h)′ − (g)′ ≥ εq (set s (x, x′) (sol dur, f (set s x (sol dur)))),
which also holds for t ∈ [0, dur] since solutions and quantifiers are prefix-
closed. From (2A) have (Dpos) d s > 0 with d constant by (V2) and (Epos)
ε s > 0 and ε constant by (V2) and (HG) h s − g s ≥ −dε with d, ε con-
stant. Let HG(t) = (h − g) (set s (x, x′) (sol t, f (set s x (sol t)))) so that
HG′(t) = p(h)′ − (g)′q (set s (x, x′) (sol dur, f (set s x (sol dur)))). Let c = ε =
(set s (x, x′) (sol dur, f (set s x (sol dur)))) = (set s (x, x′) (sol t, f (set s x (sol t))))
(for all t ∈ [0, d]) = ε s by (V2) and Lemma 23. We write ε for short since it’s
constant anyway.
Now Lemma 22 applies to HG and c on [0, dur] by (Der) so that (Progress)
HG(dur)−HG(0) ≥ ε dur > ε d, i.e., HG(dur) ≥ HG(0) + ε dur > ε d.
By (HG) have HG(0) ≥ −d ε, add with (Progress) to get (Big) HG(dur) ≥ 0.
From (Big) and instantiating (C1) at (Dur), we have the premisses of (3A), so
that (Post) pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol dur, f (set s x (sol dur)))). We conclude
p〈x′ = f &ψ〉φq s by choosing solution sol, duration dur, and noting (B1), (C1),
and (Post).
Case bsolve: Assume the side condition (V) that x′ /∈ FV(φ). Assume the
side condition (Sol) that sln is the unique, global solution of x′ = f such that
sln 0 = s x. Not every syntactically valid CdGL ODE has unique solutions, nor
global solutions, let alone global solutions which lend themselves to tractable
first-order proof obligations. In practical implementations, the latter requirement
demands nilpotence so that solutions are first-order-expressible, which trivially
implies unique global solutions because nilpotent ODEs are both linear and
Lipschitz.
Assume (0) Γ ` ∀d :R≥0 ((∀t : [0, d] [x := (sln t)]ψ) → [x := (sln d)]φ) so by
IH (0A)
p
((∀t : [0, d] [x := (sln t)]ψ)→ [x := (sln d)]φ)q (set s d v) for all v ≥ 0.
To show the conclusion [x′ = f &ψ]φ first assume some d and sol such that
(1) (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and (2) Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t)) which allows us
to show (P) pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))). By (Sol), solutions
are unique, so sln = sol. Then (2) is equivalent to
p∀t : [0, d] [x := (sln t)]ψq s
so by (0A) have (3) pφq (set s d v) which even holds for all v ∈ [0, d] since
universal quantification is prefix-closed, but especially d. By Lemma 28 and (V)
on (3) have pφq (set s (x, x′) (sln d, f (set s x (sln d)))) which by (Sol) again is
equivalent to (P).
Case dsolve: Assume the side condition (V) that x′ /∈ FV(φ). Assume the
side condition (Sol) that sln is a global solution of x′ = f such that sln 0 = s x.
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In practice it usually also the unique solution, but that is not strictly required
in this rule.
Assume (0) Γ ` ∃d :R≥0 ((∀t : [0, d] [x := (sln t)]ψ)∧[x := (sln d)]φ) so by IH
(0A)
p
((∀t : [0, d] [x := (sln t)]ψ) ∧ [x := (sln d)]φ)q (set s d v) for some v ≥ 0. To
show the conclusion [x′ = f &ψ]φ must exhibit d and sol such that (1) (sol, s, d 
x′ = f) and (2)Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t)) and (3) pφq (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))).
Choose sol = y and d = v. Then (1) is simply (Sol), (2) is left component of
(0A) and (3) follows from the right component of (0A) by Lemma 28 from side
condition (V).
Lemma 37 (Existence Property). Let s ∈ S. If M : (pΣx : R. φq s) then
there exist terms v : R and N : (pφvx
q s).
Proof. (pΣx : τ. φq s) = Σv : R. (pφq (set s x v)) so by inversion on M there
exists v : R and N such that N : (pφq (set s x v)) and such that the substitution
φvx is admissible. Then by Lemma 28 have [v/x]N : (
pφvx
q s) as desired.
Lemma 38 (Disjunction Property). If M : (pφ ∨ ψq s) then there exists
constructively an N such that either N : (pφq s) or N : (pψq s).
Proof. (pφ ∨ ψq s) = pφq s + pψq s so by inversion on M there exists L : pφq s
or R : pψq s as desired.
